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Truman Doctrine announced Mar 1947
Marshall Plan announced Jun 1947
Unification (National Security) Act passed Jul 1947
Czechoslovian Communist coup Mar 1948
Key West Conference Mar 1948
Air Force (Secretary Symington) goes for 70 Air Groups Kar 1948
SECDEP (Forrestal) resigns 3 Mar 1949
SECDEF (Johnson) cancels supercarrier (USS United States,
CVA-58) after keel laid . 23 Apr 1949
SECNAV (Sullivan) resigns 23 Apr 19^9
Congressional Hearings start on B-36 Aug 1949
Russia explodes A-bomb Sep 1949
Congress provides funds for USS NAUTILUS (SSN-571
)
1949
Navy begins design of nuclear powered carrier 1950
Navy acquires atomic weapon delivery capability 1950
Korean War commences Jun 1950
Supercarriers (USS FORRESTAL (CVA-59) and USS SARATOGA
CVA-60)) approved by Congress 1951
Truce talks begin in Korea Jun 1951
Supercarrier disapproved by Congress 1952
USS RANGER (CVA-6l ) approved by Congress 1952
USS INDEPENDENCE (CVA-62) approved by Congress 1954
"New Look" Introduced J n. Jan 1955
-USS KITTYHAWK (CVA-63) approved by Congress 1955
USS CONSTELLATION (CVA-64) approved by Congress 1 956
Sputnik launched 4 Oct 1957

USS ENTERPRISE (CVAN-65) approved "by Congress 1957
Carrier disapproved by Congress 195°
Democrats gain control of Congress Jan 1959
Carrier disapproved "by Congress 1959
USS AMERICA (CVA-66) approved "by Congress I960
First Polaris patrol 19
°°
McNamara enters office Jan ^
6l
All services asked to develop a common plane (the TFX) Feb 196l
Nuclear Aircraft Engine Project (ANP) cancelled 1961
Admiral Anderson relieves Admiral Burke as CNO Aug 1961
Navy and Air Force ordered to develop a common plane Sep 196l
McNamara agrees to new supercarrler every other year In FYDP Oct 1961
McNamara (over objections of JCS) calls up Reserves for
Berlin Nov 1961
Connally resigns as SECNAV to run for governor, Korth
appointed Dec 1961
CNO refuses SECDEF request to fight A.F. B-70 program 1962
Stennis hearings on muzzling of military 1962
"Rose Garden" talk over B-?0 funds Mar 1962
Enterprise concludes shakedown cruise APr 1962
USS KENNEDY (CVA-6?) approved by Congress 1962
B-52 production line shutdown by McNamara 1962
Ann Arbor "no cities" speech Jun 1962
McNamara awards TFX contract to GD-Grumman Nov 19
SKYBOLT cancelled, NASSAU Agreement D°c 1962
ENTERPRISE and INDEPENDENCE used in Cuban Missile Crisis Oct-Dec 1
<">''.
Navy asks to make KENNEDY nuclear-powered Jan !°63
McNamara says decision on power plant for carrier dependent





Chairman, AEC and Congress (JCAE) recommend the power plant
be changed to nuclear power Feb 1 963
McNamara "convinced" of need for nuclear propulsion by
Rickover Apr 1963
McNamara rejects Navy CVA study as "intuitive" Apr 1963
Admiral Anderson testifies to McClellan Committee on TFX
investigation without clearing speech with McNamara Apr I963
Admiral Anderson speaks on "loyalty" May I963
Admiral Anderson fired, Admiral McDonald appointed (to take
effect 1 Aug.) ? May I963
DYNA-SOAR cancelled 1 I963
Congress authorizes nuclear Frigate 19&3
Navy (SECNAV) sets ur> first small system analysis group Aug 1963
Navy loses Indian Ocean Unified Command Responsibility 10 Oct IQ63
McNamara decides against Nuclear power for USS KENNEDY 11 Oct 1963
SECNAV (Korth) resigns. (Nitze is appointed SECNAV a week '.it-r
later) 11 Oct 1963
President Kennedy assassinated, Johnson takes office.
McNamara announces reduction in CVA force (15 to 12)
ABM technology ready, McNamara shifts to cost-effectiveness
arguments against
GOP make carrier issue a political one
McNamara publically decides against AMSA (B-70)
Tonkin Gulf incidents
McNamara directs AEC develop CV two-reactor power plant
McNamara attacks Elsenhower's SECDEF in Democratic Convention
speech
President Johnson announces AEC RAD program for 2-reactor
Representative Rivers succeeds Vinson as Chairman of HASC
Heavy air raids (Rolling Thunder) on NVN begin


















McNamara decides U.S. strategic forces are larger than 1^5
necessary 1 965
U.S. enters VN war in earnest 1965
Admiral Sharp appointed GINGPAG over JCS vote 1965
C5A Source Selection Board picks Boeing (Seattle) I Aug I965
McNamara awards C5A contract to Lockheed-Georgia
_
Nov 1965
Rivers threatens President over McNamara Nov 1965
President requests second nuclear carrier Jan I966

There appears to be. general agreement that the Robert McNamara era
of Defense Department management produced (or resulted in) fundamental
changes in the relationship of Congress, the Public, the Executive and
the Military with respect to the manner in which "military" decisions
are made. At the same time, there appears to be widespread agreement
that McNamara made some critical changes in the manner in which the
Defense Department is organized and operated.
Another facet of the "common wisdom" which exists with respect to
the McNamara era deals with the Serviced' response to
{
these changes.
For example, there is a rather large school of thought that is convinced
that the Navy suffered at the hands of the McNamara team primarily
because of the Navy's indecision about how to react to the criteria and
techniques Imposed by the new management.
.
.followed by clumsiness. "^
1
.
For example see Leslie Gelb—"T
"The erosion of support for the military from the public and in the
Congress which has altered this situation (the influence of the military
on Presidential decisions) was brought about by the Vietnam war, Robert
McNamara' s years as secretary of defense, and later charges of cost
overruns and other tyres of mismanagement in the Department of Defense....
Secretary McNamara upppraded civilian advice, and less weight was given
to professional military expertise. In Washington, the feeling grew
that civilians knew as much about defense as the military, and that the
services were so concerned with their r>arochlal interests that civilians
were needed to arbitrate among them and. to ensure that all focused on
the President's view about national security." "Domestic Change and
National Security Policy," in Henry Owen (ed.), The Next Phase in Foreign
Policy
.
(Washington i Brookings, 1973), p. 263.
2. This not only Includes the introduction of academla and "think -tan';"
personnel to actual management (in addition to consultant) roVs, but
also includes McNamara' s highly personal and successful style which
centralized decision-making In the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
3. James M. Roherty, Docl^ons of R. S. McNamara . (Florida! Uni-
versity of Miami Press, 19?0), p. 1^+2. It should be noted that of all
the books on McNamara, this is ono of the very few whVch can have any

If one starts with the basic premise that United States "National
Security" has as one of its pillars, the capability of the United States
Armed Forces, one could become very interested in whether or not (or
how), the Services changed to conform with the new situation. The first
step in such a determination is to ensure that one's assumptions are
correct. One approach to accomplishing this check would be to select
one specific service/McNamara dispute and attempt to determine if the
events can be explained by the existing model,
I choose the Navy-McNamara controversy over the decision to build
the USS JOHN.F. KENNEDY (CVA-6?) as a conventionally-powered Instead of
a nuclear-powered vessel. There were several reasons for this choice,
but the most important ones were that: l) there has not been a great
deal of scholarly (or even polemic) attention paid to the issue; and
2) it is one of the few issues on which McNamara later publicly changed
his position, The first reason may be both a resultant of the second
item and a result of (the existence of) McNamara * s decision to proceed
with the deployment of the ABM, which is a more prominent and popular
instance of McNamara, at least partially, reversing his position on a
pretensions to being a critical analysis. . .
,
k. This is a loose use of the term model, but I am using it in a roughly
similar manner to the "academic" type model Abraham Kaplan (The Conduct
of Inoulry
.
(Scrantont Chandler", 1964), p. 259) describes, and by which
I am referring to the theory that McNamara was able to gain a firm grasp
on the needs of nafonal security. That by means of cost/system analyses
he was able to determine "How Much Is Enough." Th'.s "breakthrough" has
enabled and encouraged the influx of a great number of flexible, brilliant
mini's into the field of national security. That these minds were hereto-
fore held back by the ill-founded concept that the only people qualified
to give military advice were people with experience in the area. The
"model" further implies that due to hierarchi.al stodigir.m the Services
were too slow to learn new and better methods of determining national
priorities, and thus they were (justifiably) left out in left field by a
prophet (McNamara) who was interested in getting the job done (i.e.
getting the most security for the country at the least cost), not in
protecting historical (and obsol escent) perogatlves and relationships,
-6-

major issue. There is still an attraction to the nuclear-power-for-
carriers decision however, because, unlike the ABM issue, the question
of carriers as major weapon systems is still pertinent(as is the corollary
question of nuclear power for major combatant surface ships), and,
McNamara's change-of-heart on the carrier system was justified on the
grounds of changes in the cost-effectiveness of carriers. Since there
exists no study (as was done on the ABK)^ which explains this change as
due to bureaucratic factors (vice cost-effectiveness factors) we have a
controversy which appears to be more easily explained by the "HcNamara-
era" model. In addition, the carrier propulsion controversy would appear
to have prlmae facie interest, in that in a space of, three years (l°63~
1966) Secretary KcNamara made a complete reversal in his position on the
question of nuclear power for carriers. From this fact alone, one would
seem to be on firm ground in drawing the conclusion that either KcNamara
was completely wrong to begin with, or, the Navy reacted rather quickly
(i would maintain that three years is the essence of bureaucratic quick-
ness) to Secretary KcNamara' s new system. Since neither of these latter
conclusions is consistent with the McNamara-era model, the carrier
propulsion controversy acquires some singular discriminatory aura among
the .major controversies with which Mr. McNamara was associated.
5. Referring to Morton H. Halperin, "The Decision to Deploy the ABM:
Bureaucratic and Domestic Politics in the Johnson Administration," Worl d
Politics
. 25, no. 1 (October 1 072)1 62-95.
6, It is perhaps significant that Rohorty Is the only author who
considered the carrier decision to be of significance, despite the fact
that the Issue received a great deal of coverage in all the major new6
magazines and nowsi:>aperr, , For example, Enthoven and Smith Identify and
discuss only "three controversial pro-ram decisions," the B-70, SKYBi LT
and the TFX in th"lr book (Alain C. finthoven and K. Wayne Smith, H"w
Much is Enough ? (New York: Harper & How, 1071 )), and they uvold the
real controversy in the latter by noting that--
Unfortunately, wo are not qualified to write a

As quickly became apparent during my research, the selection of an ©
issue which has received relatively little academic interest does not
necessarily mean that the subject itself is limited in scope. In fact,
a major problem in discussing any issue which is felt to involve national
defense, is that the bureaucratic actors and considerations become so
myriad and complex that it is difficult to deal with in a paper of any
reasonable size. Therefore, while I have attempted to provide the
reader with an historical background for the controversy, and the issue
firsthand account of the main TFX decisions in the
early 1960's which sparked much of the controversy.
As has been made clear more than once in the public
record, the Systems Analysis office was not involved
in the early TFX decisions." (p. 262)
Their only comment on the carrier controversy (p. 325) is to use it
as an example of the Services using President Kennedy's decision to not
establish arbitrary budget ceilings as an excuse for the Services to
avoid hard budget decisions themselves and to—
flood OSD with proposals for more of everything,...
As a result, the burden of choice in judging Service
proposals rested almost entirely on the Secretary of
Defense and his staff. And since the analysis of
complex defense issues is almost never clear-cut and
provable one way or the other, this meant that the
pressure on the Secretary for continuous budget
increases was very great.
The point is that McNamara's change of mind on the carrier issue
made it not one of the better items to use in discussing the imrvict of
the Secretary on the Defense Department, so the Issue seems to have been
Inrpely ignored by the great majority of historians/wrl ters who have
been sympathetic to McNamara's general thrust.
It is also worthy of note, since I will later attempt to draw
attention to the relationship between the two, that Enthoven war, appar-
ently making an attempt to disassociate the use of system analysis from
the decisions on both the TFX and the carrier (see above quotes).
Finally, on the subject of l.ho various controversies with which
Mr. McNamara was associated, to my knowledge the only two on which ho
publlcally acknowledged a change of por.ltlon were Vietnam, the A M
nuclear power for the CVA-6?. This in itself seems to imply thai there
is some value in the study of the latter as perhaps Instructive on the
former.

and goals as seen by several players, I have concentrated on attempting
to determine and explain how the Navy, as represented by the Chief of
Naval Operations, perceived the issue and evaluated the decisions. This
limitation probably serves to impart a bias to the presentation, but if
one is interested in determining the whole "truth," it appears necessary
to begin by reading one aspect accurately. Since the various Chiefs of
Naval Operations (CNOs) during the 1960s were definitely major actors in
the controversy, and since an evaluation of their positions is in itself
a worthwhile undertaking, I have consciously applied this limitation.
It seems pertinent at this time to also note how I conducted my
research. I first grounded myself in the secondary literature by reading
discussions of Secretary KcNamara's reign,' and on the history of National
Strategy development, with particular emphasis on the part visualized
Q
for or carried out by the Navy. I then reviewed the periodicals which
7. Particularly Robert J. Art, The TFX Decision
. (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1Q^8); the Enthoven and Smith book previously mentioned; Charles
J. Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense. (Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press, I067); Willi am VI. Kaufman, The KcNamara Strategy
.
(New
York: Harper & Row, 1964); Robert S. KcNamara, The Essence of Security.
(New York: Harper & Row, 1968); Richard E3, Neustadt, Alliance Politics .
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970); James M, Roherty's pre-
viously cited book; and Henry L. Trewitt's KcNamara . (New York: Harper
& Row, 1971 ).
8, Including Vincent Davis, Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy
,
3-1 Q*tS. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, T966)
j
and by the same author, The Admirals Lobby. (Chapel Hill: The Univer-
sity of North Carolina Press, 19^7); H*. G. Head and E. J. Rokke, An
Defen se Polic y (3rd. ed.). (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1 iJl
Edward A. Kolodziej, The Uncommon Defens e and C ongress, 1 n; l 5 -19''- 3.
(Ohio State University Press, 1966)1 Harland 13. Houlton, From Su -- 1 ty
to I'arl ty . (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1973); Urs Schwarz, American
Strategy: A N.-w Perspective
.
(New York: Doubleday, 1966)j and Y.
Harkabi, Nuclear V.rar and Nuclear Peace. (Jerusalem 1 1966),

dealt with the subject between the years 1958 to 1966, and the appli-
cable Congressional Committee hearings for the same years. ° Finally, I
interviewed the men who had been the Chiefs of Naval Operations for the
critical years of 1955-1967 and I interviewed the man who had been Vice
Chief of Naval Operations (VCNO) for the last two years of the Eisenhower
(pre-McNamara) presidency jf for the first two years of; Kennedy's. The
VCNO had then held other responsible Navy billets throughout the remainder
of the KcNamara years.
Perhans the best manner in which to start a discussion of the issue
is to quote the author of the currently-accepted-most-accurate-explanation
of the controversy as to his impressions of the Navy position on the
question as to whether the KENNEDY should be nuclear-powered
—
(T)he Navy did not enter into the fray with its
customary assuredness. .. .there was noticeable
ambivalence in the Navy attitude toward, nuclear
propulsion. .. .the Navy had allowed a doctrinal gap
to develop with respect to the utilization of attack
carriers. . .in likely post-World War II scenarios. 11-
If Rourke is correct in his evaluation, then what possible explanations
are there for the Navy attitude?
9. Specifically the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations
Committees hearings on Military Posture and the Appropriations bi]ls for
the years 1958 through 1967, plus the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
for the year 196,1 and 1966 through 1971.
10. The CNOs were Admirals Arleigh Burke (1055 to 196l), George Anderson
(1961 to 1 063 ) and David McDonald (1963 to 1967). The VCNO was ral
James Russell (l958-l°6l) who later was C0HS0UTII (in Naples) from I
to I965, and then was recalled to active duty in 1 967-8. Paraphraelons
of these interviews are contained in Appendices A through D,
11. Rohorty, op. cjLt
. ,
pii. lk[-2, Rohnrty is considered the authority
on this issue, by default, in addition to his instructive arvilyslo.

I would propose that there are three likely explanations. First,
there is the McNamara-era model which postulates that the Navy was over-
whelmed by the sophistication of the cost-effectiveness work being done
by the System Analysis staff of Secretary McNamara, and was organiza-
tionally and temperamentally unable to adapt in time to become effective
as an organizational actor. Secondly, there is the possibility (which
is also suggested by Roherty) that the Navy simply misjudged the situ-
ation.* -that the Navy had a sufficiently good case for nuclear power
(with the Congress) to enable them to force the Secretary's hand and
achieve nuclear propulsion for the CVA-67, but they just didn't realize
it (their political "sense" was inaccurate or inadequate). A third
possibility is that the issue was not important to the Navy, at least
not as important as other goals.
Rather than trying to specifically prove or disprove any of these
suppositions, I intend to discuss what I feel happened, and then return
to this question of whether or not Dr. Roherty has correctly diagnosed
the causes of the symptons he has (correctly) identified as being super-
ficially unexplained by the Navy actions.

In order to understand the historical framework in which some of
the major actors may have regarded the carrier controversy, it seems
worthwhile to review a little bit of United States military/strategic
history. With respect to national strategy, some editorializing can
save a great deal of time. When one examines many histories of national
strategic thinking,
*
2 I suggest that one almost Invariably is struck by
the impression that any successful national strategic policy had to
display rather specific characteristics—it had to be the cheapest policy
available which could be accepted as rational by the general populace.
Included in the latter portion of the requirement was the assumption
that the policy could be reduced to terms assimilatable by a great number
of relatively unsophisticated (in this area) citizens. In effect, all
one is saying is that for a citizen to politically support a particular
national defense strategy, it must require the least possible sacrifice
on his part (and I would propose that the citizen (at least) subcon-
sciously performs a trade-off analysis of definite personal money costs
versus potential personal life costs), and the policy must be at least
superficially rational.
It almost seems impossible to emphasize the importance of the cost
factor. The historical oceanic insulation of the American continent
from the maelstrom of European conflict, and the oppressive political
burden which peacetime defense spending appears to inevitably become,
soems to suggest a Gresham Law of strategic theory, in which tho cheaper
theory prevails in spite of any shortcomings (which are generally expen-
sive to compensate for).
12. Particularly tho proviously cited Schwarz and Davis books.

If these generalizations are correct, one would expect that in
those instances in which one strategic defense theory was both cheaper
and sirrroler (to understand) than any others being promoted, one would
see that particular defense theory become extremely dominant and prosper
at the expense of all other theories. One can further extrapolate and
anticipate that not only would this be expected, one can also expect
that it would be impossible to unseat this dominant theory (unless one
could develop a cheaper one) unless some perceived valid threat to the
country's security forced a reexamination. If you will accept the
validity of this summary of the primary characteristics of American
strategic theory, then it appears useful to draw some conclusions about
the possible results, particularly with respect to the military services,
of these circumstances. I would theorize that in those eras in which
one particular strategic theory was both less expensive and more easily
understood than any other, that particular theory would become dominant.
Since inexpensive theories are inevitably those which do not require the
complete panoply of military services, in our divided service organi-
zation, one service is almost certain to feel that its prominence (rela-
tive to the other service(s)) is being slighted. * It does not seem,
unreasonable to suppose that the service being slighted either sincerely
13. A scholarly investigation has determined what many who have worked
in the Pentagon have sensed--
In some Instances according the services more (or
less) funds is related to a change in behavior. .. .we
have found that the amount of money involved is not
necessarily the most important consideration. For
some areas the important thing is how the money is
distributed among the services,
Charles Herbert Longley, "Politics in the Pentagont A Study oT Contei -
porary Civil-Military Relations." (Unpublished Doctor's dissertation,

believes, or can convince itself that it sincerely believes, that the
strength of America's national security is in some manner directly
related to the strength of the particular service with v/hich one is
associated. 1 ^ Therefore, one would expect that periods of dominant
strategic theory would tend to be ones of interservice rivalry, as one
of the services would feel that its relative dimlnuatlon of power not
only threatened the existence of the service, but also threatened the
security of the nation. This is not, of course, to say that one would
not expect Interservice rivalry in those. eras in which one particular
national security policy was not dominant, for in all probability the
different services would then be advocators of competing theories, but,
no service would feel that its existence was being both pragmatically
threatened and theoretically justified.
With this introduction, one can look at the history of American
strategic thought in this century. The post-World War I era was one of
dominance for the "Blue Water" theory. This was the "strategy" that the
United States could take advantage of th^ expansive oceanic barriers,
and avoid the maintenance of an expensive force under arms. By construct-
ing a Navy (of minimal size since any potential enemy would have to
operate so far from their base of sunply), the nation's safety would be
assured. In the event of Impending invasion, the Navy would form up
(they were not normally operated as a fleet in being, but instead home-
ported at separate locations on the coasts) and sally forth (in all
probability toward the setting sun to meet the Japanese) in order to
!'»-. Which is only a little longer phrasing of "Wh^ra you stand dependa

meet the enemy out on the broad, expanse of the ocean. ^ The American
continent and other areas covered by the Monroe Doctrine would not be
threatened by the specter of war. It is worthy of note that this doctrine
was not only inexpensive and simple to understand, but was also recon-
cilable with the American experience which had seen the two real threats
to American security coming as a result of seaborne invasions in 1776 and
1812.
World War II marked the end of the dominance of the "Blue Water"
theory. The development of the land-based strategic bomber and the
American sole possession of the atomic weapon ushered in a new era.
There no longer seemed to be any question as to whether or not land
forces and naval vessels were extremely vulnerable to air attack (with a
nuclear weapon). With the absence of the former Assistant Secretary of
the Navy from the White House for the first time in more than a decade,
one might expect the Navy to feel particularly vulnerable.
15. Although the ships were divided on one coast, the fleet was main-
tained in only one ocean until rapid access between the coasts was
ensured, as can be seen by Theodore Roosevelt's 1909 letter to his
successon
Dear Will: One closing legacy. Under no circum-
stances divide the battleship fleet between the
Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans prior to the finish-
ing of the Panama Canal.
which is printed in Elting E. Korlson, ed., The Letters of Theodore
Roosevelt
.




l6 ( A not unjustified feeling given President Truman's special message
to the Congress in December 19'*- 5 in which he confirmed that, unlike his
predecessor of eight months past, Truman was in favor of "an overall
military ch^ef of staff to head the single department" and ass] the
Navy's land-based aircraft to the new Air Force. See Domotrios Caraley,
The Politics of Mil i tary Un i fication . (New Yorki Columbia University
Press, 1966), pp. 38 and 55.

In the period of flux following World War II, the Services engaged
in a fierce battle for theoretical dominance. The Army was determined
not to permit the postwar army to again fall into such a state of disre-
pair as had occurred following World War I. The most practical method
of preventing this was perceived to he the limiting of the Navy by : •
achieving a voice in the Navy's budget proposals. ' Thus the Army was
in favor of unification of the Services. The President was in favor
of unification for completely different political goals, but his position
(as evaluated by Caraley) is particularly noteworthy because the concept
19
resurfaced in the late 1950s:
17. One must remember that prior to unification in 19^7 the Secretaries
of War and the Navy had no common superior except the President and
questions as to the size of the respective budgets and programs were
primarily determined by the respective Congressional committees.
18. Not only was the Army interested in gaining a check on the Navy's
growth (through the Combined Chief of Staff, which would, given the
relative sizes of the services, logically be an Army Officer), but also
the Arjny was interested in checkmating the Marine Corps. The Marine
Corps had undergone phenominal growth during World V/ar II and at the end
of the war, where there had been less than one division tre-war, there
now stood six full divisions. In addition to these parochial irritations,
the Army had not viewed with pleasure even operating with the Marines
during the war, much less the fact that one of their generals had been
relieved for cowardicy under fire by a Marine general. For a descrip-




19. The tenor of the Congressional desire for strong leadership in the
Defense Department can be seen in such documents as the U.S. Congress,
House, Hearings
,
before the Subcommittee of the House Appropriations
Committee, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1^58, 85th Congress,
1st Session. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971 ), pp. 70'lff,
particularly in the questioning of Representative Mahon as to the coor-
dination of the Service requests. A comparison of the motive force
behind the unification issue in the late 19'l-Os and the Congressional
request for increased centralization in the late 1950s is well summarized
by Caraley, op. cit .. p. 239--
Except for tho Army Pearl Harbor Board's report,
General Marshall had not boon publicly criticized
during the entVre war and it appears as if a scape-
goat, even if it were an organizational form, had to
be found on which to focus the blame and protect his
and othor genorals' and admirals' reputations.* In

Truman thought that a single cabinet officer over
all the armed forces and single military budget, by
presenting a common front to Congress, would maximize
presidential control over the military establishment.
The Army Air Corps saw unification (in which the Army and Navy were to
be placed under one Secretary of Defense and simultaneously the Air
Force would be created from the Army) as the only way in which "Air
Power" would achieve its proper role as a military weapon. The Navy
feared unification not only because they were apprehensive of the Army
gaining budgetary control over the Navy (through a single Chief of Staff
of the Military), but also because the Air Corps was attempting to gain
control of all air power which was not sea-based, a move that would have
immediately sharply curtailed the Navy's air antisubmarine role (which
any event, from the fall of 19^5 on- -and probably
until the present day—the idea that lack of unifi-
cation "caused" the Pearl Harbor disaster had been
accepted by a large part of the general public as an
article of faith to be challenged only by the Navy
obstructionists. .
.
*SiF:ilarly, America's failure to match the Soviet
achievements in space and missile efforts In 1957
was widely attributed not to incorrect policy deci-
sions at the highest level but to inadequate defense
organization and led to proposals for change in the
Department of Defense to "eliminate interservice
rivalries."
20. Caraley, op_. clt
. , p. 85.
21, In the years Immediately following World War I, the Navy and the
Army air forces had bureaucratlcally developed along very dissimilar
lines. The Naval Air contingent had rapidly achieved autonomy ami
recognition within the Navy and was well satisfied with Its position
wlthlnr the service. The Army Air Servlce/Corps/Forcos, on the othi c
hand, did not achieve autonomy until just prior to World War II, and did
not feel that their true potential could bo realized while and If tl
reralned a part of the Army. For an excellent comparison of the dif-
ferences in development sen Davis, Lobby , p_n. clt . , pp. 60-100.

was primarily carried out by land -based aircraft), and which would have
established a precedence for an Air Force take-over of all the Navy
22
aircraft.
The other essential element of the unification controversy which
was to reappear during the KcNamara era was the public interest which
succeeded in maintaining political interest in the unification issue:
There is... little reason to doubt that in the
unification conflict the most widely shared public
interests Involved were "combat effectiveness" and
"economy.". , . .Another. . .public interest appears to
have been "civilian control of the military". , .as
the feeling that professional military officers
should not have undue influence over national policy. *
The success of the unification proponents in 19^7 was due to several
bureaucratic factors, not the least of which was Secretary of the Navy
Forrestal's decision to cut his (the Navy's) losses in the battle with
the President and accept the inevitable (with the assurance of Congres-
sional protection of the naval a.viators and the marines). Another crit-
ical factor was the change in political leadership (democrats to repub-
licans) which effectively removed the most anti-unification Congressmen
2kfrom effective positions of power.
22. If the Navy had lost their land and sea based air power, they would
have been stripped of forty per cent of their officers and the great
majority of their force projection capability. For data on the percentage




p. 127. With respect to force projection, one should realize that the
Navy had ended World War II convinced of the value of the airplane as
the primary fleet force projection weapon. Probably the best demonstra-
tion of that concept is that the Navy had only one ship with large
(eight-inch) guns in commission at the end of the Vietnam war.
?3« Caraley, op. clt
.
.
p. 277. Although I do not consider it signi-
ficant, it should be noted that I have omitted the phrase "though some-
what less certain" that Is between "Another" and "public interest appears
to..." in the original.
Zk t See the discussion in Caraley, op. clt., j^y. 2 r.6ff. and Robert
Crconhalgh Albion and Robert Howe Connery, Forres ta! and the Il.-ivy . (New
York i Columbia University Tress, 196:0, VV> 250-206.

As the Defense Department budget continued to decline during the
post-war years and the "massive-air-deterrent" theory gained more and
more popularity, the Navy felt itself to be severely threatened. Only
two years following the unification controversy, which could probably be
claimed as a "no decision" contest (i.e. draw) by Navy supporters, the
Navy's role in the national defense and their air power capability were
again under attack. -^ The question centered around the Navy's plans to
build a flush-deck carrier (one without an Island) which would be large
enough to carry the planes which themselves were large enough to carry
the immense atomic weapons. The Navy had felt that this new "super-
carrier" was so vital to their plans that they had volunteered to cancel
thirteen other ships which were in various stages of construction in
order to fund the supercarrier out of the Navy's assigned ship construc-
tion funds. Unfortunately for the Navy, ex-Naval aviator, ex-Secretary
of the Navy, and current Secretary of Defense Forrestal died. One month
later, his replacement, Louis Johnson, announced, five days after the
keel had been laid, the cancellation of the supercarrier (and the addi-
tional loss to the Navy of the thirteen ships) in order to fund an
Increase in the number of Air Force strategic bombers (B-36s).
2f>. In the strategic era following World War I, the Army Air Service
had attacked the Navy as being no longer relevant to an age which had a
tactical bombing capability. "(T)he doctrine held... that the airplane
had rendered obsolete all military forces designed to fight on the
earth's surface." Davis, Lobby , op . c i
t
. , p. 29. For an excellent
account of this era, including the Navy's objections to various Air
Corps "tests" of surface ship vulnerability, beginning with Mitchell's
verbal attack on the Indiana (the charges had been placed by hand), see
Charles K, Melhorn, "Lever for Rearmament i The Rise of the Carrier,"
(Unpublished Doctor's dissertation, University of California at San
Diego, 1973), particularly pp. 126-1 38.
26. The accepted definitive account of this period is the 1 03 page
"article" by Paul Y. Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombersi Appro-
priations, Strategy and Politics," In American Clvll-MH \ tary l)och\ <> ,
Harold Stein (ed.). (Blrmln«ton« University of Alabama Press, l'H>'j).

The Navy reacted by attacking the Air Force B-36 program, both in
public and via the Congress in the well-known "Revolt of the Admirals."
The results of this controversy with the Secretary of Defense over the
advantages of sea-based versus land-based strategic airpower were disas-
trous for the Navy. Not only was the Navy unable to reverse the Secre-
tary's decision, and therefore lost not only the supercarrier, but also
the total building program for 19^9, but in addition they lost a pro-Navy
Secretary of the Navy and saw him replaced by one who was definitely the
27Secretary of Defense's man, Following the unsuccessful revolt, the
Secretary of Defense retaliated by firing not only those Admirals who
had taken a public position in the "Revolt," but also those, including
the CNO, Admiral Denfield, who had only disagreed with the Secretary
within proper channels.
It was a resounding demonstration of not only the power of the
Secretary of Defense (in 19^9!*' )» out also the dominant position of the
Air Force in conjunction with the dominance of the theory that land-based
strategic air power was cheaper than sea-based strategic air power, and
that strategic air power was all that was necessary to attain the United
no
States security requirements. Possibly the person who was in the best
While the cancellation of the carrier and the beefing up of the number
of Air Force B-36 air groups were not directly related by any of the
major Defense Department (as opposed to Navy) partici7>ants, the fact
that they were linked in actuality can be seen by Hammond's title,
27, The fact that the Secretary of Defense had made the decision with-
out giving the Navy a chance to reclaim (shades of the TFXI ), and a
description of the shipbuilding sacrifices made by the Navy to fund the




20, "In criticizing the navy's carrier pronram (Clarence) Cannon (chair-
man of the House approximations committee) argued that the House should
put 'money in the only place that counts, and tint is on lonpc-ran^e,
land-based bombers.' Cannon based his r.upport for more strategic air
power on the assumption that a third world war would bo nhort, precludln .

place to observe all of this was a Navy captain--Arleigh Burke, who was
in the midst of the Navy coordination of the "revolt's" Congressional
testimony, and who, in retaliation for that assignment, was personally
removed from that year's Admirals selection list "by the Secretary of
Defense, " Since Admiral Burke was to he the Chief of Naval Operations
when McNamara arrived to work his revolution, one might surmise that he
was already fully aware of both the Secretary's power and the problems




Cannon was to remain a constant critic of the Navy carrier program,
and his position in the Congress continued to give weight to his thoughts.
It does not seem unreasonable to propose that he was attracted to the
idea of the primacy of the Air Force because of his dislike of Federal
spending, for he was famous for his economies, Newsweek magazine pre-
sented the following sketch of him
—
Missouri Democrat who was first elected to the House
in 1923, has been chairman of the powerful Appro-
priations Committee since 19^1... a man who has
dedicated his legislative life to cutting the Federal
budget... has never hesitated to fight for economy
even with his fists... (13 Hay 1957, p. 3Z0.
At the same time, his dislike of the Navy has prompted attempts to
explain his feelings as due to other factors
—
Cannon himself has not taken a junket since his trip
to Europe in the fall of 1 9'+7 1 when he came down
with a ferocious toothache in Athens. He hunted up
a United States Navy dentist, but in the excitement
the luckless medic nervously pulled the wrong tooth.
Cannon has taken a dim view of the Navy ever since,
(Paul F, Healy, "Nobody Loves Clarence," The Saturday Evening Post ,
25 Karen 1950, p. 132).
29. Hammond, op. cit ., np. 546-8, describes the "purge" that followed
tho hoarlnf;s, despite the House Armed Services Committee's Chain in'
specific warning apalnst such action. Ho notes that Durko was placi
back on the list due to Republican Congress Lonal pressure,

extant in attempting to fight the Air Force head on with respect to the
30
merits of land versus sea-"based air power. -/
The Navy appears to have escaped further immediate deterioration
(hoth real and relative) by the beginning of the Korean War,
51 but her
position in 1950 was drastically different from her position at the end
of World War II. First of all the Navy had lost the position of being
the service whose budget requests were looked on with favor in Congress
because the public viewed the services mission as the cheapest (and thus
the first line of) means of obtaining sufficient defense. In fact, the
Air Force budget was now more than 5<# of the total DoD request. While
the Korean War may have demonstrated to some that the concept of massive
retaliation was not a completely reliable concept, the latter still had
a wide following. 52 Concurrently, the carrier weapons system had been
30. Although this is not necessarily so. Admiral Russell noted that
Burke was not at all inhibited by the events of 19^9 (Appendix D, Answer
#2). But it does seem at least worthy of comment that Burke was not to
cross swords with KcNamara publicly, and neither did Admiral McDonald,
who had been the Naval aide to the Under Secretary of the Navy (Dan Kimbal)
during the period of the "Revolt" and had been deeply involved in Con-
gressional liason. The CNO who did challenge KcNamara head-on (to the
detriment of the Navy) was the one of the three who had not seen the
"Revolt" and the aftermath from close-up, but who had been isolated (in
school at the National War College) during the events. (For Admiral
Anderson's biography, see Congressional Record for 22 Aug. 1961, Appendix,
P. A6570, which is a reprint of an August 196I article in SHIPl-'ATC.).
31. Hammond, on. cit. , pp. 502ff, lists Secretary Johnson's FY 1951
plans as including a 507$ cut in the Navy carrier forces and. air groups,
with less drastic' (but substantial) cuts in other ship categories.
32. John Spanler, American Forei gn Policy Since World War II (6th ed.j
New Yorki Praeger, 1973), pp. 10^-5, explains this apparent anomaly
thuslyi
This reliance upon strategic air power was, .. expected
to appeal to the American public. In the first
place, "massive retaliation" simply sounded more
dynamic than containment j at the same time, It made
possible a reduction of over-nil military expendi-
tures. It was obviously considerably cheaper to
concontrate military spending upon a nno-woapon

shown to "be vulnerable to successful attack by those who felt that other
Items should take priority. The Secretary of Defense's well-pub],icized
success in striking the carrier gave renewed hope to all those who either
opposed the carrier or supported another budget item. Another factor
which would prove terribly significant during the 1960s, but which was
practically overlooked in the events of 19^9 was that in the same budget
from which the supercarrier had been struck, the first funds for the
supersubmarine (USS NAUTILUS) were included. These nuclear submarines
would prove to be so capable in both the tactical and (when combined
with the Polaris missile) strategic field that they would gain an over-
whelming number of Congressional adherents, but they would prove to be
so expensive (ten times the cost of a conventionally-powered submarine)
they would cause the Navy a great deal of pain. While these latter
remarks may be getting somewhat ahead of ray paper, perhaps it does seem
appropriate to point out again that the loss of the supercarrier had
been coupled with the loss of practically the entire surface ship building
program, and that when this happened again in the early sixties in the
controversy over nuclear power, the parallel may have caused some Naval
personnel some remorse.-^
system than to build up and maintain large balanced
forces to meet any contingency. The second appealing
feature of massive retaliation was that it, in fact,
rejected the concept, of limited war, or "half war,"
and reasserted the old American doctrine of either
abstaining or fighting an all-out war. This return
to the more traditional American approach to war was
natural in 1952. The Republicans had been elected
largely because of the deep popular revulsion against
the Korean War; it was clear that the people wanted
no more Koreas.
33. None of the people interviewed drew this parallel, however, It
should bo pointed out that all the people Interviewed except Burke were
aviator officers and would be oxpocted to bo primarily oriented toward
recognition of the problems existent in the Naval Air community. Perh

In order to discuss McNamara's period in office, it is also neces-
sary to provide some background on the rest of the events of the 1950s
following the Korean war. The period demonstrated at least three sepa-
rate trends. The first years ( 1952 -5*0 were marked by Congressional
Interest in insuring that the Defense Budget was reduced as much as
possible in order to limit the amount of "waste and inefficiency" and in
order to "guard against economic collapse."^ This reaction produced
the expected reaction with respect to the Navy appropriations, for
Representative Gannon was successful in killing the supercarrier request
in the FY 1953 budget. 35
The second phase was the "New Look" which Eisenhower unveiled in
his FY 1955 budget request and which effectively used a reliance upon
tactical and strategic nuclear weapons to justify the maintenance of the
desired defense spending ceilings, and which resulted in the relative
decrease of expenditures for the Army, as the Navy carrier air wings
this is an unwarranted extension of his remarks, but it seems possible
to read the second paragraph of Burke's answer (Appendix (A)) to question
#1 and his answer to question UZ as displaying some impatience with the
fact that the Navy was maneuvered into a position with McNamara in which,
as under Johnson a decade earlier, surface ships had been sacrificed to
build a carrier which was then never built. One must realize that
despite some claims to the contrary (see paragraph three of footnote
number six for Enthoven's comment) the services had already made choices
between weapons systems before the budgets were presented to the Secre-
tary. For a discussion of the specific ship sacrifices which the Navy
had decided upon in order to fund, the requested follow-on to the Enter-
prise (the next nuclear-powered carrier) see L. Edgar Irlna, "Navy to
Fight for Nuclear Carriers," Washington Star , 30 November 1958, p. L,
3')-. A good analysis of these years Is contained in Kolodzlej, on. cit.
,
pp. 1 2*4-324. The quote Is from the same source, p. 156.
35. This sunercarrier request was for a second one, as the Navy had
rotten their first sunercarrier, now officially designated the CVA
^
(attack heavy carrier), during the Korean War budget of FY 1951. The
Ship had been named the USS FORRESTAL and tho sunercarrier class th
became the Forrestal class. The idea of the angled deck had supercr
<
the concept of a "flush dock,"

were accepted as having a strategic strike capability which would sup-
plement the Air Force' s.3° The third phase of the Eisenhower years was
the post-Sputnik era. The launching of the Sputnik on k October 1967
produced a complete reorientation in the public and congressional view
of the proper size of the Defense budget. There appears to be a great
deal of evidence that in the absence of prompt Executive branch action
to reassure the American people on the question of n.-tional defense, the
Democrats in Congress, under the leadership of Senator Lyndon Johnson
and Represenative Sam Rayburn, seized the opportunity to use the issue
of the Defense budget for the 1958 and i960 elections. -"
Unfortunately for the Navy carrier advocates, the question of
whether or not the carrier was a cost-effective weapons system was still
an issue with the Congress. Despite the fact that the Navy "acceded to
President Eisenhower's suggestion that the carrier be conventional rather
than nuclear-powered, as a money-saving consideration,"-' the House
Defense Appropriations subcommittee (under Mahon) and committee (under
Cannon) refused to provide funds for construction in debate on both the
36. See Kolodziej, op. cit . , p. 189. Note that the Air Force's fears
of the inevitable result of the loss of Air Force wings as a result of
the Navy acquisition of an atomic weapon delivery capability were proven
to be accurate fears by the first Eisenhower budget of the "New Look."
In his account of the development of the Navy capability, Vincent
Davis appears to be of two minds as to whether or not the intcrsorvice
rivalry had a significant effect unon the Navy development. In Thr;
Politics of Innovation: Patterns in Navy Cases . (Denver: University
of~Denver, 196?) Davis maintains that Commanders (later Admirals) Ashworth
and Hayward would have gone ahead with this development without the
service rivalry, but he fails to adequately explain how they would have
developed the "vertical alliancos" within the Navy without the ra-ensure
of the Air Force competition. On the other hand, in Postwar Defense .
op. cit., np. 22^-5, Davis notes that the intra-service rivalry had a
"decisive" effect upon the development of the Navy's capability.
37. Kolodziej, op.. cU., pp. 272Tf.
38. Jack Raymond, "House Croup Bars Aircraft Carrier," The New York
Tinier,. 15 May 195% P. 7.

FY I960 and FY 1961 appropriations bills. The difficulty the Navy faced
In obtaining any type of carrier can be best seen by noting Representative
Cannon's identification of the carrier as singlehandedly responsible for
the decline of the United States as a world power. 39 Faced with this
opposition, plus the continual sniping by Admiral Rickover as to any
decision to build a conventionally-powered carrier, plus renewed
39. This remarkable speech, contained in the Congressional Record for
the House for 4 August 1959 (Vol. 105, Part 12, pp. 15105-6) is remi-
niscent of Cannon's objections to the carrier during the 19^9 contro-
versy. It is also indicative of the House's attitude toward the carrier
in the period immediately before the McNamara era (see Admiral Russell's
comment in response to question #5 (Appendix (l))), and Admiral Burke's
answer #2 (Appendix (A)), For both of these reasons some of the speech
is quoted herewith!
"(T)here is one fact that stands out like the headlight on a loco-
motive at midnight.
It cannot be denied. It cannot be evaded. It cannot be palliated.
It cannot be hidden. It stands out stark and grim and menacing
against every horizon.
Since 19*4-5 "the United States has steadily declined in relative
military strength as a world power.... as a result of that growing weak-
ness we have every year less ardent friends and more agressive enemies.
But the situation is more alarming than that.
Every year since 19^-5 Russia has steadily grown in relative military
strength as a world power. ... (Following World War II) we did not confer
with Germany or Japan on the terms of surrender. We did not meet in any
conferences at Geneva. We did not hold any meetings at the summit, we
did not leave unsettled the status of any American national as a prisoner
of war. We did not have brush f ires. .. .what has brought about this
remarkable change?. .. .It is very simple. .. .One thing and one thing alone
....We have frittered away on carriers the time and attention and money
vie should have devoted to the missile and the submarine. ... (Why) America
has dropped every year in relative military power and Russia has risen
every year in world priority. ., .There can be no other explanation. It
is as simple as that. It is the carrier, ... (Funding of carriers will
not) keep the Russians out of the United States."
U0, Rickover was the unrelenting author of statements on the value of
spending money on conventional carriers such as "You know darn well that
to buy an obsolescent ship is stuuid," reported in the Mew York Times
,
?.R Hay 1959, p. 60.
Admiral Russell described the effect of this uncoordinated (Navy)
policy as being "The primary problem wo wore having in Congress war, thai
they wouldn't vote for the carrier requests unless it war, nuclear-powered
and we couldn't ret it through the Secretary as nuclear-powered,"
(Appendix (D), Answer #5)« Admiral Burke, following his own pe]
poll of the Congress, determined that the voter, wore there for a conven-
tional carrier, but not for the added cost of nuclear power (Appendix

questions (encouraged If not sponsored by the Air Force) of carrier
vulnerability to air strikes, it does not seem surprising that it took
at least two years of trying to get just one carrier past the Congress
in the last years of the Eisenhower presidency (after the Democrats
gained control of Congress).
It seems reasonable to summarize the situation with respect to
carriers and nuclear power upon the entry of Secretary McNamara into
office. With the exception of one year of grace during the Korean War,
each carrier appropriation request since World War II had faced stiff
opposition within the Defense Department from both the Air Force and the
Army. ^ The primary questions that were continually brought up against
(A), answer #l). Perhaps it is correct to say that thtTNavy^ere not at
all sure that they could get any carrier through Congress in the late
Eisenhower years, and were not quite agreed on the optimum packaging
(power plant, size, etc.) that would best aid passage. For a reference
to the indecision on size (whether or not a smaller carrier would be
better received) see the Washington Star
.
7 January 1959, p. 29.
^1 . The question of vulnerability received new attention in early I960
after the Defense Department conducted exercises/tests in which the Air
Force Tactical Command was pitted against the Navy's Second Fleet. An
event of such magnitude (and importance to the respective services)
could not remain secret long and what appear to be self-serving leaks
from both sides soon appeared in the pre^.s. For example, see Hanson W.




For Congressional interest in the vulnerability issue see the
testimony before the House Appropriations Committee on the Department of
Defense Appropriations for 1958, £P« °JJ:«» PP« 6?lff,, and for 1959
(85th Congress, 2nd Session), pp. 52^+ff.
^2. It is worthwhile to review the cause of this difference of opinion
between the services, because there had been a change In the Interests
of one partlcirant since 19^9. The Air Force still oppor^d the carrier
because they felt that land -based air was less expensive and more effec-
tive than sea-based air. The Army, however, had become sensitized to
the relatively new danger Russian submarine::; por.cd to troop carriers and
logistic support sunply lines. The Navy's Inability t.o claim either to
itself or to others that the solution to Lhe anti -submarine was in hand,
led many people to call for increased orientation of Navy funds ftorvth'^
offensive-minded carriers to defensive-capable antisubmarine forcei .
For an expression of Conrrer.slonal sentiment unon the occnr.lon In

the carrier were the ones as to its vulnerability to air attack, and
whether or not the money could not be better spent within the Navy in
the area of anti-submarine warfare or for the purchase of more Polaris
forces. -' In addition, as of the late 1950s, the question of nuclear
power became a double-edged sword as far as the Navy was concerned,
because if it really were so good for submarines, weren't carriers that
weren't nuclear-powered simply out of date before they were floated.
The real "problem" with carriers in the late fifties and early sixties
appears to have been the same problem that became apparent in 19^9—not
only were they a big juicy item, they were vulnerable to attack from all
interested actors who felt they needed money. In Washington that's like
throwing blood to piranhas to whet their interest.
increasing appropriations for anti-submarine forces, see the House of
Representatives Report No. 408, Department of Defense Appropriations
Bill, 10^0 . 86th Congress, 1st Session (Washington! Government Printing
Office, I960), pp. 60-1.
For a popular expression of the same sentiment by an Officer who
came to have some impact unon the utxjomlng administration, see Maxwel]
D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet
,
(Now York: Harper & Brothers, L959)»
p. 100—
With regard to the Navy, the Army. .. .views the Navy
carrier program as unjustifiably larr:e, while favor-
ing primary attention to the antisubmarine warfare
program
.
In addition, It should be noted that the A3W (anti-submarlno war-
fare) mission did not compete with any Air Force or Army - in and
therefore may have been looked upon by them as a good job for the Navy.
U'l. Th« fl-rat Pnln-Ho reitml had hnnn made in mld-l°60.

In order to discuss the Issue from what is hopefully a different
perspective, it is first necessary to ensure that a common interpreta-
tion of the original events has been established. The following is an
attempt to establish just such a common knowledge of the events which
surrounded the CVA-6? controversy. After the two year hiatus in
carrier construction which occurred w-nTh Sputnik, a conventional carrier
(the USS America) was approved by the Congress in 196l, and concurrent
with the inclusion of a carrier in the FY62 budget request, the Navy and
Mr. McNamara agreed on an every other year construction program for
Forrestal (non-nuclear) carriers through 1970. * At the same time, the
CNO directed Adrn. Rickover to begin work on a reactor design which would
be less expensive. Within a year, the Navy and AEC had succeeded in
kk. There are not many explanatory discussions of the events of the
controversy, and there are none that adequately covers the events. In
addition to the Roherty one which has already been cited, there are two
excellent articles in news magazines: Luther J. Carter, "Nuclear Car-
riers: Studies Convince the Skeptics," Science . 18 March 19^6, p-n. 23ff.j
and "The Navy Gets a Go-Ahead for Nuclear Carriers," in National Observer,
7 March 1966. The most Conrarehensive overview of the public record is
that provided by Congress in their Hearings on the Naval Nuclear Pro-
pulsion Program--! Q^7-68 , Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 90th Con-
gress, 1st and 2nd Sessions, (Washington: GPO, 1 968) . For an account
of the controversy in 1963, Hearings on Nuclear Propulsion for Navil
Surface Vess els, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 88th Congress, 1st
Session, (Washington: GPO, 196'+) is invaluable.
45. See the article by Jack Raymond, "Navy Supported in Carrier Drive,
Pentagon Would Bui Id Super Vessel Every 2 Years," New York Ti mes. 25
November 196l, in which he discloses the building program which McNamara
had approved for the Five Year Defense Plan (FYDP).
U6. "I sent word to Rickover that I couldn't justify an eight renctor
carrier, and that he should r.ct busy and design a modern plant which
• ould cost less and would he less complicated." (Appendix (D), answer
/A). It should be noted that the Enterprise had had eighl sepal <
reactors (actually they were paired ant! operated with only four separate
primary plants). The design which will be suggested for the CVA-6? only
rcqulrod four reactors, as each new reactor was more powerful. The
design which was finally aeurovod for use In the Nimitz (authorizi I In
FY67) was a two reactor one. The question of savings thai was Invoiv
in each change had to do with the reduction in the dunllcatlvf equipment
(both primary and secondary propulsion equipment) as the power-

producing a design which would in effect halve the costs of nuclear
power (in comparison with the Enterprise), and, perhaps even more impor-
tantly, the Navy had gained a great deal of operational experience with
the Enterprise operating in normal peacetime maneuvers and under Alert 1
(the Cuban Missile Crisis) conditions both by itself, in coordination
with an all nuclear task force, and in comparison with a conventional
carrier of the Forrestal class. ? The Navy in conjunction with the AEC
and the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy thus asked Mr.
McNamara for permission to change the propulsion package on the CVA-67
to nuclear power in order to take advantage of the new technical achieve-
ments and operational experience. McNamara noted that the advantages
claimed by the Navy
—
(D)epend on the assumption that the future Navy will,
indeed, make full use of nuclear power. It is pre-
cisely this question which lies at the heart of the
matter; far more so than the question of whether
CVA-67 itself should or should not be nuclear powered.
Accordingly, I should like you to undertake a com-
prehensive quantitative study of this matter. ...As a
general guide, I am interested in achieving the most
efficient possible naval forces, defining efficiency
density of the nuclear reactors w^re increased, awhthe reduction in
maintenance costs (attributed to refueling) and the cheaper cost of fuel
that was Inheront in longer core-life reactors.
t7, The Enterprise had been part of a task force commanded by VA''
! i..
John T. Hayward, an officer who had earned a great deal of rcsDcct in
the Navy and the civilian commun'ty duo to his drive (ho had progressed
from batboy to the Yankees throurh a seaman in the Navy to his current
rank), his practical (see footnote /A36) and academic (ho had earned a
doctorate in solid state physics) accomplishments, and his pleasant
personality. For his very effective testimony \n favor of nuclear power,
a testimony that finished his career in the Navy as far as McNo
concerned, see the 1 963 Joint Commit teo on Atomic tinorgy JCAE Hearings,
pp . cit . , pp. ^9-68.

as achieving the most beneficial military results for
a given expenditure.
McNamara rejected the first Navy study as not "being sufficiently
detailed^ and requested that it be redone. This time the Navy took six
48. SEGDEF to SEGNAV memo of 22 February 1963 reprinted in I963 JCAE
Hearings, op . cit
. , p. 231. The request was for a study of considerable
breadth, involving not only the question of nuclear power for all ships
of the task force and the logistic support forces, but also how the
nuclear Navy was to be deployed, how the Fleet administration was to be
changed, how nuclear design questions were to be handled and the impli-
cations on nuclear power on the reduction of the number of ships in the
fleet.
It is difficult to read the directive without the suspicion that at
least some of the questions were asked "because the Navy reaction was
expected to be highly negative (particularly on the question as to the
changes in deployment and administration of the Fleets and how the number
of naval ships could be reduced by going to nuclear power).
A more presentimentive individual might have seen that the result
was preordained by the manner in which the question was stated, for
there was no conceivable way in which the Navy could afford to "make
full use of nuclear power," and if McNamara felt that the Navy's case
was dependent upon the validity of that assumption, the case for nuclear
propulsion for the carrier was lost before the battle of cost analysis
was joined,
49. The Navy reply was contained in SECNAV to SEGDEF memo of 4 April
1963 (reprinted in I963 JCAE Hearings , op. cit., pp. 231 ff.) and was
certainly a rapid reply given the scone of the request; however, one
sees the final statement in the request "Please advise me when the study
referred to above can be completed" and rememberj? the fact that McNamara
had informed the AEC and the Congress that the question was being pur-
sued "as a matter of urgency" and "high Priority." See SECDEF to AEC
memo of 2 February 1963 (reprinted in 1963 JCAE Hearings , op. cit ., p. 81 ),
and DDR&E memo to Chairman, JCAE of 18 March 19^3 (reprinted in same
publication, p. 3)«
Perhnns the fact that McNamara considered the Navy reply so inade-
quate (SECDEF memo to SECNAV of 20 April I963, reprinted in 1 963 JCAE
Hearings, on. cit., pp. 240ff.) does not reflect the fact, that SECJ
was changing his renuirements for the study, but only that communications
between McNamara and Korth had completely broken down. Neither of those
interpretations would appear to give the Navy much encouragement in
their quest for nuclear power for the carrier.
As a note for those who have not spent much time either working or
observing the inner workings of a bureaucratic organization such as the
Defense Department, it is my observation that one docs no', write a
memorandum (particularly an unclassified one) to one's Immediate bo
(as McNamara was to Korth) unless you knowi l) that he apreea with you
and exacts you to make a formal statement for the record; ?.) that he
will not be publicly embarrassed by your memo and will not find It
diffiult for either you or him to accept or reject the recommendation
. 1 ax ..n ._ ^\ . ,i « ., * ., ~ 4.^ " -Ti 1 T *-*« w/Mir nu/-.vil *' ^nr».nn-'n \ 1 S a f\

months to prepare the study and there is every indication that the effort
was truly of the proportion that McNamara had requested. McNamara
rejected the results of the latter study just in time to present the
Congressional investigation on the matter with a fait acompli
.
and
ordered that the Navy proceed with construction of the conventionally-
i
powered carrier. ^ The Secretary of the Navy promptly resigned without
matter of principle or some such other high-flown reason. This exchange
of memos does not appear to meet any of these requirements, and would
appear to cast some question on the working relationship between (at a
minimum) Korth and McNamara.
50. SECNAV memo to SECDEF of 26 September 1963 forwarded the Navy's
conclusions (see JCAS Hearings , op . clt . , pp. 104ff.). The actual study
was delayed and McNamara had not received it prior to his making his
decision on 9 October to build the conventional carrier in order to
avoid further delay since he was "confident that construction of the
fiscal year I963 carrier with conventional rather than nuclear power
would not result in any serious loss in effectiveness." (JCAE, I963,
Hearings, op. clt
. , p. 244).
He had similarly not received the Navy study or reviewed any other
by the time he testified before the JCAE on 13 November 19»3 ( Hearings ,
ou. clt .. pp. 167, 173, and 195).
There was considerable feeling on the part of some observers that
McNamara' s need for haste in making a decision was not due to a fear of
further delay in laying down of the ship (see the history of keel laying
dates following), but rather an attempt to defuse the issue in Congress
(see Pastore's angry remarks in JCAE, 1063 Hearings, op. clt . , p. 2) and
John W, Finney, "McNamara Bars Nuclear Carrier Sought by Navy," New York
Times, 26 October 1963, p. ljj "McNamara Faces Fight on the Carrier,"
New York Times
.













Hull No. Authorized Keel Laid
59 FY52 Jul 52
60 FY52 Dec 52
61 KY54 Aug 54
62 FY55 Jul 55
63 FY 56 Doc 56
64 FY57 Sep 57
65 FY58 v. h 58
66 FY61 Jun 6l
67 FY63 Oct G\
Sourc o 1 Jane's Figh ting Sh 'p'

giving any reasons and McNamara appointed an old friend, Paul Nitze, to
be the new Secretary.-*1
In his justification of his decision before the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy in November of that year, McNamara set the scene with a
quote by Clarence Cannon on the usefulness of aircraft carriers and then
discussed that he had decided (against nuclear power) because i
a. There was a greater need for land-based tactical
air than for more expensive sea-based tactical
air capability. -*
b. There was a need for more ships (and the increased
- cost of nuclear power would prevent their construc-
tion). 53
51. Does the parallel with 19^9 seem forced? For an account of Korth's
resignation concurrent with his criticism of the carrier decision see
"Pentagon Policy Scored by Korth," New York Times , 31 October 19f>3,
p. 18.
'
52. JCAE, 1963 Hearings , on. cit . , p. 157, McNamara recalled his priority
list from his January 1962 testimony before the HAG, and said that it





2. Increase in combat-ready army divisions
3. Antisubmarine warfare weapons
4. Torpedoes and iron bombs •
5. Fighter aircraft for the fair (force
6. A carrier
7. Aircraft for the Navy and Marine Corps
53. Ibid ., np. 159ff. Of particular interest is the problem
McNamara
had reconciling hl.s concern for the effect of the high-cost nuclear
carrier upon the remainder of the Navy's building program (i.e. there
would not be enough money left to build smaller ships) with the democratic
policy of "no budget ceilings." McNamara did not succeed In convincing
Congress that there was a dlscernablc difference. As can be seen by
examining Apuendlx (B), Congress had good reason to be skeptical.
Particular attention is paid to the Procurement funds as the Important
ones (at least for the Navy and the Air Force), r.lnco those figure
determine the hardware each service Is allowed to buy, and thus Us
cutting edge. The most significant years to examine are 1962 and 19&3,
since the former was the last Elsenhower budget, and the latter was the
first McNamara one produced by his "revolutionary" technique, Whn* tie
technique may have been truly revolutionary, the results were any!
but. As can be seen by comparing the two years, the Navy prone
the total procurement budget remained the same ( totals are
nnmm nf *hn hurlret was allocated to Departmental expenses (serial , a,,)),

c. The aircraft carrier was vulnerable.^
d. The attack aircraft carrier was of limited use
in anti-submarine warfare, 55
e. No studies of cost-effectiveness had convinced
him that nuclear power was cost-effective,
particularly since one of the "advantages" of
the nuclear powered carrier was that since it
was bigger (due to the increased diameter needed
for the power plant), one could get another air
squadron on board, and McNamara actually consid-:e
ered that a disadvantage! (?)^°
The Navy position was that the nuclear-powered carrier was much
more cost-effective than the conventionally-powered ship when one com-
pared the costs of the entire weapons system (in other words, since the
purpose is to provide tactical air power, the total cost of the weapons
system includes the carrier, the air wing, the escorts, the logistics
support ships, the base support, administrative costs, etc.;, there was
procurement budget that was spent for ship construction and conversion
significantly decreased, and only two-thirds of that decrease was due to
a lesser strategic funding.
5^. Ibid
. , p. 180. For an earlier attempt at what/'news management" by
McNarnara's staff on the question of the carrier vulnerability, see
.
"Pulling the Carrier's Plug," Time
.
(29 March 1963), p. 16.
55. JCAE, 1963 Hearings , op., cit
. , pp. I85ff.
56, Ibid., pr>, l67ff. and p. 188, McNamara does not quote any cost-
effectiveness study which he says that he had carefully read. He does
offer an interesting comment on his position as to the usefulness of
sea-based tactical air-
Representative Bates. Would you pay any premium at all,
5, 10, 3 per cent for a differential in nuclear cost."....?
Secretary McNamara (Did not answer the question
asked, but noted instead), .. .The specific question is wh-it
kind of premium would I pay for a nuclear-powered carrier. In
the first place, I would not want it to have another attack
squadron on it. That is point No. 1. I would not pay anything
for that. That cost in the CVAN-6? is fairly substantial,
I don't know exactly what It is. But it is probably on
the order of $30 mill ion..., I would not pay anything for th.it..
(p. 188)

only about a ^>% differential in favor of the conventional carrier. This
differential was more than compensated for by the nuclear carrier's
increased mobility capabilities, decreased refueling requirements (she
still had to receive aviation gas, ammunition, and oil for any conven-
tionally-powered escorts), the extra on-board space stowage for aviation
i
fuel, the decreased dependence upon a logistic^ chain, the lesser
maintenance required both on the propulsion plant and on the airplanes
(due to the absence of stack gas residue), the increased safety (no
exhaust stacks meant a smaller island and less air turbulence and increased
visibility for landing pilots) and a more reliable propulsion plant.'''
While the KcNamara "systems analysis" position is not clear at the
time of his decision in the fall of 19^3, over the next few years it
became evident that the Systems Analysis branch of the DoD (DoD/SA)
agreed with the total cost concept but disagreed as to the method by
which costs were computed. The DoD/SA approach was to charge the carrier
cost with the extra squadron of planes which it was large enough to
carry, and the cost of seven years of fuel, to use a rapid discount rate,
to insist that the escorts must be nuclear also, and to use a scenario
of peacetime refueling and wartime ammunition replenishment,-5 All of
these factors favored the conventional carrier answer.
,57. Ibid., p. lO^ff., (Second Navy study), for one source, or any Navy
testimony from 1963-70. For an excellent summary oT the sub/ec' from
the Navy's noint of view, see Adrnira] Hlckover'r, testimony in the House
Armed Service Committee, Hearings on M ilitary Posture, 1966 , 89th Con-
gress, 2nd Session, (Washington s GPO, 1966), p~p. 8l28ff.
58. The nuclear-powered carrier was estimated by DoD/SA to cost approx-
imately $160 million more than a conventional carrier. Of that amount,
$32M was for the cost of the corer. which hnd an expected life lime of
seven years, but no costs were charged the conventional carrier for either
the oil which would be used durinr that period, or the infrastructure
necessary to provide that oil. $37'"' more wa:; for the extra squadron of
planes which the nuclear carrier could carry and the conventional one
could not. (No increase in effectiveness was postulated Tor the Lnc

The Joint Committee on Atomic Energy's position remained rather
constant throughout the controversy
—
given the life of the carrier as
30-odd years, it is wise to build a conventionally-powered ship that we
will still be relying on in the year 2000? In addition, they were
fearful that step improvements in the nuclear power for surface ship
planes, just the increase in cost.
The discount rate is used in analysis to compensate for an increase
in cost of buying the same capability at a future time (the rate of
inflation). It tends to make the more expensive initial investment
relatively even more expensive if the rate is set artificially high.
These were, DoD/SA was using 10/o/year for the aircraft carrier. This
was a critical assumption, for the comparison was very sensitive to the
actual discount rate used (that is, one can make either the conventional
carrier or the nuclear one come out less expensive (assuming equal
capabilities) depending on what one asr.umes for a discount rate)).
Another critical cost assumption was for how long the capital investment
was useful. Obviously, the longer the carrier was assumed to be useful,
the less the differential in cost was per year, particularly since,under
the rules by which DoD/SA analysis was done, only the first ten years of
cost were computed. In the OSD/SA analysis, the carrier was assumed to
have depreciated 50/& in the first ten years. Since the Navy was operating
the carriers at full capacity for an average of 30+ years, the Navy
disagreed with this critical assumption.
Obviously, increasing the number of ships in the task force which
are nuclear-powered , increases the cost of the task force and thus the
nuclear-powered carrier. It does not change the effectiveness part of
the cost-effectiveness ratio because DoD/SA could not agree on anything
that the nuclear carrier would do better that could be quantified, except
for speed (and eventually oil usage). Since the conventional carrier
could go as fast (the Navy had designed 1 he reactors to produce the same
speed as they were presently using), until they ran out of fuel, DoIj/SA
had only to think of a reason to minimize refueling time (the Navy can
and does refuel at high speed as a normal course of action). This was
accomplished by assuming that whenever the conventional carrier needed
fuel, wherever In the world, an oiler would be instantly available. The
Navy felt that this assumption ignored both practical logistics suj^port
and the problems of wartime contingencies.
For some discussion of these factors see Garter, op. cit. ; the JCAE,
1963 Hearings , on. cit .. p. IV, p. 37ff., p. 72, and particularly pp. 07-
100j a classified memorandum from DoD/SA to SiCCNAV and SBCATH of 1 June
1°68 signed by Mr. Enthoven, with the classified Navy reply Op-0.5W
(Scr 0022^P05) of 26 June 19681 and Joint Senate-House Armed Services
Subcommittee, Hearings on the CVAH-70 Aircraft. Carrie r, 9lst, 2nd.,
(Wnshlngtonj GFO, 1970), pp. 299ff., and p. ?,n(> for carrier operating
lifetime.
For the final (SECDEF approved) cost analysis, see the SECNAV to
SECDEF memo of 22 April 19^6 on Nuclear >'owcr for Surl .A
copy is included in Hearings, before th" House Armed .''rrvieen Comml U
;

field (an area which served as a prototype for civilian
reactor develop-






The issue was finally resolved in January 1966 when a
request for a
second nuclear carrier was included in the President's
budget. McNamara
gave as rationale for this new decision the reduced
costs that now were
possible due to the development of the two-reactor
power plant for
carriers which had finally made the nuclear carrier
cost-effective. (
nn Mmtarv Posture . 89th Congress, 2nd Session (1966), pp. 803^-8096.
59. See the Chairman of the AEC, Dr. Seaborg's,
testimony in JAEG l^
Hearings , on. cit., W 72ff . , and Representative Bate s comments in
1Q66 HASP Military Posture Hearings , on. cit., p. 0OO0.
60 See U.S. Congress, Senate. Subcommittee on
Armed Services of
Appropriations Committee. ^111^^^^
tions. 1967 . 89th Congress, 2nd Sessionr(S-2-19), pp. 326-7
ior some
pertinent testimony which includes the following:
Senator Cannon. Will you explain to us why... you
were
able to convince us so ably last year (against the
carrier;
and why you have reversed your position this year.
Secretary McNamara. ...I think it is 3 years
ago.... The
additional construction costs for the larger carriers,
plus
the nuclear power, plus the additional aircraft,
run to some- .
thing on the order, if my memory serves me
correctly, of WOO
million. ... . , , , , .
That carrier with a two-reactor power plant will
be
cheaper and more efficient than a four-reactor
power plan
and on that basis I believe we are justified in recommending
nuclear power now....
Senator Cannon. At the time we were discussing this
matter before, though, you indicated that the support
ships
would of necessity have to be nuclear-powered, as I
recrtlj
Secretary McNamara. No, sir. If I said that,
I war. In
I don't believe I said that.
Senator Cannon. That was my recollection. .. .1 mean
the
ships that go along with it.... (escort vessels;
Secretary McNamara. It is not necessary for
the escort
vessels to be nuclear-powered. As I suKi • .ted,
am nclined
to believe that it will not be desirable to
provide nuclear-

Returning to the original question, it appears that there may be
some value in investigating whether or not a bureaucraticbl evaluation
of the controversy might not provide some heuristic value. Despite
James Roherty's comments, it doesn't appear completely clear that KcNamara
made his carrier decision on the basis of system analysis (cost-effective-
ness) considerations. In fact, there are three specific reasons to
believe that the decision was not ever related to this "new" science
which became so important before HcNamara's tenure was completed.
First of all, from Enthoven's discussion of the TFX and carrier contro-
versies (footnote #6), it seems evident that OSD/SA was not involved in
the decisions (I include the TFX decision because the time frame is so
powered escorts for all nuclear-oowered carriers.
Another source (Carter, op. cit .) credited two other system analysis
techniques which the Navy had proposed. One was that the carrier should
be evaluated as to effectiveness on the number of sorties launched and
recovered per unit time (or before having to retire to be replenished
with fuel and ammunition). This analysis had shown that the nuclear-
carrier was more cost-effective (see first paragraph of footnote #50),
and had probably resulted from the Enterprise's demonstrated 20$ greater
capability off the coast of Vietnam.
The second change in technique referenced was the consideration of
the carrier as a forward floating airbase, and the reduction of the
number of air wings to match the number of carriers actually in commission
(not in overhaul) at any one time. This reduced the cost of the air wing
(since airplanes are replaced at an average of every seven years, over
the lifetime of t'-e carrier, the cost of the air wing is about 80$ of
the cost of the entire task force), charred to each carrier (the "average"
carrier) and also made the nuclear one more cost effee Live.
61. By which I am referring to the decision process described by Graham
Allison, Essence of Decision, (Boston: Little, Brown, lQ7l) In which
"the decisions and actions of governments are intranational political
resultants.
.
.(a product of) comraromicf:, conflict, and confusion of
officials with diverse interests and unequal influence." (p. l62J
62. That the science is not as new or as uncommonly used in the Navy
many people believed can ucrhapr, be shown by noting that Hi" application
o r system analysis to Naval problems was a six-hour course a1 th< Un!
States Naval academy banning in 1959 and had a rather dial it \Xi
career during World War II in all hervioos. Nava]
(Annapolisi U.S. Naval Institute, 1 n68 ) , p. v. "A History of ons

similar (see chronology)) to any great extent. Secondly, Secretary
McNamara's testimony before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in 19&3
gives the definite impression that not only have no comprehensive studies
"been done on the subject, but that the Secretary does not approve of any
of the ones that have been done::- (footnotes #52 and #56). Perhaps even
more significant is that, as one reviews McNamara's public statements on
the issue, it becomes obvious that much of his dislike of the nuclear
carrier proposal was shaped by preference for land-baser] tactical air-
craft^ rather than sea-based tactical aircraf-ty. Since no study was
performed which compared the two until after Mr. McNamara had left
office, 3 it seems clear that McNamara was not basing that preference
(or perhaps a better word is "feel") on any systematic analysis.
63. To the best of my knowledge, the first study done on the subject is
the classified one referenced in footnote #5&# the (unclassified) title
of which is "The Relative Cost of Land-Based and Sea-Based Tactical Air
Forces." After reading the related correspondence and revised studies
which were done on the subject between June 1^68 and. February 1970, I am
of the opinion that the study of 3 June I968 was the very first time it
had been done. I make that assessment because of the "roughness" (i.e.
so many items done by OSD/SA which were inaccurate and on which they
immediately backed down when challenged by the Navy analysts) of the
study at that date. I have also made inquiries with negative results as
to previous studies on this subject. It is worthy of note that OSD/BA,
the Navy and the Air Force were unable to come to final agreement on vari-
ous cost factors (neither would accept what was not beneficial to their
own case), despite direction to do so, and even after forming a joint
study grout) which included the Financial Management (civilian) Assistant
Secretaries of both the Navy and the Air Force.
The primary analyst responsible for the study (Mr, H. Rosenzwelg)
moved to Brookings and attempted to get them to publish his study (which
is strongly anti-Navy), after he was not successful In DoiJ after McNamara'
left. It is that same study which provided the basic Information for the
Senator's Mondale and Case attack on the C
V
AN -70 , op. c 1 1. . , and a dis-
cussion of the basic Issues can be found on pp, 223ff. The basic Navy
position is found on pp, 75-6, while what appear to be the pro-Air Force
(anti-Carrier) questions are primarily those asked by Senator Symington
on pp. 126ff.
6^, Perhaps this is as good a place as any to note that I on not trying
to charge that McNamara felt that system analysis could arrive at a
definite answer on a complex decision, only that he was not himself
using anything moro than the most rudimentary analysis in thin nd

If this tentative conclusion is valid, why did. he make the decision
against the nuclear-powered carrier? Perhaps the answer li^s more in
bureaucratic rather than cost-effective reasons.
To begin with, from the Navy's point of view, they didn't have very
good relations with the Secretariat (neither the Navy nor Defense one)
before KcNamara came into office. Secretary Gates was insistent on
reducing the amount of Navy-Air Force bickering that became public, and
the Navy still didn't feel the Air Force had enough consideration for
the Nation's interests (as opposed to the Air Force bureaucratic ones)
therefore was being misleading if he claimed that any decision was made
because of the results of the application of system analysis to the
carrier controversy. As to the potential pitfalls of analysis in the
National Security, area, I agree with James Schlesinger, "Quantitative
Analysis and National Security," World Politics (January I963), pp. 295-
31 5« For one of the more conoise statements on the issue, I bow to
Michael H. Armacost, The Politics of Weapons Innovation! The Thor-
Juplter Controversy
,
(New York! Columbia, 1969), p. 291—
Systems analysis cannot substitute for wise judgement.
Nor have its sensible proponents ever claimed that
it could. Systematic analysis may, on the other
hand, serve to sharpen the intuitions of decision
makers,,., It may. , .refocus the strategic dialogue
among the services upon the real issues.
As to the manner in which McNamara was using system analysis, I lean
toward the evaluation that he used it to
—
give legitimacy to their exercise of budgetary
influence, since this would appear less an exercise
of arbitrary whim and personal bias and more a result
of a "rational," "objective" process o^ analysis and
evaluation. Such trapping of rationality proved a
tremendous bargaining advantage for KcNamara, not
only with the services but with Congress as well, at
least in his initial years.







Princeton University Press, 1972"), p. 207.

to be trusted. -5 Therefore Admiral Burke was not interested in censuring
flag officers who "told it like it was," whether or not the Secretary of
Defense was livid. Similarly Burke was not interested in the Air Force
gaining operational control over the Navy strategic forces (especially
Polaris), and did not hesitate to use his legal right to appeal to the
President over the SECDEF in order to prevent the Air Force from oven
becoming encouraged.
In the opinion of at least one Admiral, the poor relationship with
Gates was the direct cause of the beginning problems with McNamara. '
Unfortunately, the Navy under Burke was not able to regain any
personal relationship ground which they may have initially lost with the
new group of civilians. While some of this might be attributed to the
new SECDEF' s personality, it appears that it may have been just as much
65. Although possibly (definitely, I am sure most would say) an irra-
tional feeling on the part of the Navy, it was still very real. For
example, the CNO at the time McNamara entered office felt that
—
The Air Force was pushing air power at McNamara,
They either did not have the wisdom nor the integrity,
one or the other, to realize that was not the whole
answer, that it was wrong. (Appendix (A), answer //3»
paragraph ^).
and his vice-chief expressed the opinion that
—
They were a new service and they didn't have the
responsibilities that the other two did. (Appendix
(D), answer #6.
)
66, Incidents related by Admiral Russell, (Appendix (D), answer //l
,
first two paragraphs), in setting the circumstances in which McNamara
took office.
6?. "Gates was pretty mad at us and he told McNamara he had to watch
those Admirals and Generals or they'd run over him. For a man of

or more the fault of the senior Navy representatives. 68 Whatever the
causes, it seems safe to say that the Navy had not established an espe-
cially good rapport with the civilian side of the Defense team.
Perhaps the lack of Navy rapport with McNamara's team would not
have been considered important, but there is at least a prlmae facie
case to be made that the Secretary and his staff were originally biased
in favor of problem solutions which favored the "Air Force" rather than
the "Navy" answer. There are three aspects to this consideration:
1) McNamara and his staff had personal ties to the Air Force and were
more familiar with Air Force capabilities and arguments, therefore they
were more likely to recognize the applicability of an "Air Force" approach
to new problems; 2) In the controversial issues, KcNamara demonstrated a
tendency to select solutions which favored the Air Force, and 3) Whether
or not the first two points are true, the Navy thought they were, and
acted accordingly.
With respect to the personal ties of the Secretary and his staff,
one must consider that KcNamara had been a consultant before the war for
the Air Force even before he served his World War II duty in the Army
Air Corps evaluating bombing damage effectiveness, and he retained his
McNamara's personality, that was all he needed." (Appendix (l)), answer //l
)
68. It appears evident from at least two of the incidents described byburke and Russell that they had some immediate problems in determining
the proper approach to both the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary
of the Navy. The SECNAV incident was perhaps not as serious as presented,but might be thought more of describing the general atmosphere of mis-
understanding, that existed within the Navy command (Appendix (D), answer
#1, paragraph 3). The incident with McNamara (Appendix (A), last paj
Kraph), on the other hand, not only demonstrator, the same point for the
Navy-Defense relationships, but also seems moro damafflnp; with each
rereading. Given the observed personality of one o<" the participants
and the reported personality of the other, one can Imagine the fir
poking to elicit a response and unexpectedly hitting a 1 tforo, but one
cannot even imagine what the results of such an incident might

Colonel's commission in the Air Force Reserves during his tour as Secre-
tary of Defense. ^ His principal assistants in the offices of the
Comptroller and Deputy for System Analysis had been associated with the
Air Force through their work at RAND, which had evolved from Douglas
Aircraft, and was almost exclusively devoted to work for the Air Force
at that time. The importance of this influence in these offices seems
difficult to expand out of proportion since McNamara had himself risen
to president of Ford through those routes. For his own Deputy, McNamara
chose a man (Gilpatric) who had been Under Secretary of the Air Force in
the 1950s, and McNamara chose a personal associate from his teaching
days, Eugene Zuchert, as his Secretary of the Air Force. Zuchert had
been Assistant Secretary of the Air Force during the Admiral's revolt of
1949.
70
What is perhaps even more important were the group of advisors whom
McNamara relied upon for advice as to National strategy. When one con-
siders the fact that McNamara certainly had no credentials in the field,
and by all reports did not generally accept advice by the military on
the subject, the source of his advice becomes a very critical factor in
evaluating what possible pressures (overt or covert) he might have been
subjected to. In this respect, It has been reliably reported that
69. Trewhitt, op. clt .. p. 36, reports that McNamara was first turned
down by the Navy because of poor vision.
70. Ibid, pp. 11-13 and 36-39 on the backgrounds of the particular men
chnsen (Trewhitt noes not note Zuchert' s previous experience). See
Bruce L. R. Smith, The RAND Corporation, (Cambridge! Harvard University
Press, 1966) for a discussion of RAND as it developed from Douglas
Aircraft Company. Robert K. Massle reported that Bnthoven's job for the
past four years (probably only job considering his youth) was to analyze
various aspects of SAC. "Fight for Survival of the Supercarrier,"
Saturday Eveni ng Post {?. November L963), p. 18.
Detailed resumes of McNamara, Gilpatric, Dram and Hitch are con-
tained in House Armed Services Committee, Hearings on Military Posture.
1Qf>T. fifith Congress. 1st Session (Washington! GPO, Wn) , pp. 358-36I .

McNamara relied almost exclusively upon "a relatively small group of
persons formerly associated Kith RAND but with an exceptionally strong
in-group cohesion among themselves..."^
With respect to the alleged demonstrated partiality toward the Air
I
Force, two examples seem prominent. The first is the question of land-
based versus sea-based tactical air, and it appears that the record is
clear that McNamara favored the former. In addition, it appears not
unreasonable to draw the conclusion that, at least at first, McNamara
was against the carrier because he "felt" that land-based air power was
less expensive and just as effective. In this context, the fact that no
one felt it necessary to even conduct studies on that issue until after
McNamara had departed from DoD seems significant.
The second example is the TFX, of which more will be said at a
later point, but one could make the argument, that, given the commonality
requirement, "since the most critical design parameters were those
involved with carrier operation," the Navy, not the Air Force, should
have been designated as the controlling/coordinating Service at the
beginning. In that way, the Navy would not have been forced into a
design that was impractical for carrier operation.?2
71. Bernard Brodie, "The McNamara Phenomenon," World Polit ics (July
1965) f pp. 678-9, The remainder of the sentence is: .
and thus a sometirr.es marked degree of personal and
intellectual separation from most other members of
that organization that developed a philosophy extremely
close in detail to that which Mr. McNamara has since
made his own.
72. For one expression of this opinion, sen Appendix (C), answer #6,

The most important of these three aspects is the
third, for if the
Navy felt that the Secretary and his staff were
biased, it seems at least
possible that "the thought might be the father of the
deed," and even
more probabl£>hat in acting in conjunction with this
conviction, the
Navy might damage either the acceptability or the
credibility of their
position. After this build-up, it seems anti-climatic
to observe that
in their interviews, each CNO who was
associated with McNamara and his
staff reported that he felt that the Secretary




At least one comment must be made about McNamara' s
personality.
His failure to either, understand or to care about
the social ammenities
(e.g. answering an invitation to visit) was interpreted as
a personal
insult by CNOs who had managed to rise to the highest
level within,'
their profession without losing a sense of courtesy.
74 At the same time,
one Admiral felt that there were problems with the
McNamara character,
besides a lack of social, graces—
in office for only three weeks when I found that
McNamara was a liar. I can't say that he consciously
told lies, but he is the type of person who is so
sure that he is right, that he changes things around
in his mind. He doesn't really know that he is
lying.
?3. Burke did not, but his VCNO did express
that fooling For spec I He
comments, see Appendix (B), answer #9; Appendix (c), answers
,/l and ,/6;
and Appendix (d), answer #3*

Another manner of approaching the carrier decision is to ask what
McNamara's interests in the decision were. In other words, putting
aside the question of land-based versus sea-based tactical air for a
moment, is it possible that McNamara had any other interests in the
issue?
I
I think the answer is definitely yes, I would propose that McNamara's
primary interest, just as is commonly thought, was to gain control of
the military. As Admiral Burke expressed it so well when quizzed as to
the Secretary's orientation:
They weren't oriented toward anything. They were
interested in getting control of the military. They
were young. They didn't know their ass from a tin
cup about the military strategy or world problems,
• After a while they learned some of the arguments
that were being used and they used the same arguments
to try to get control.'-*
If this were the Secretary's goal, then 1 August I96I was a temporary
setback, for the new CNO was not willing to bend as far as McNamara
required of his Chiefs, While the final boiling point was yet some
months distant, perhaps the end result could have been seen in January
of L962 when the CNO refused to obey McNamara's instructions to use the
Navy to lobby in Congress against the Air Force B-70 program.
McNamara would have to face that one himself, '
75t Appendix (A), answer #3»
76. For one account o r this requirement, see John G. Norris, "Dropping
of Anderson Is Viewed as Warning," The Washington Post
, (8 May I.063),
p. A2. For another, more personal view, see Appendix (U), answer //3,
paragraphs 2 and 6,
77. "I didn't fet Involved in inter-service rivalry. One of the first
things Fred (Korth) brought down to mc vras the word that McNamara expected
the Navy to ^arry the freight in Congress lobbying against the blr:
aircraft, what was it, the B-70. I told Korth that I wouldn't do It,
that I understood the Air Force pretty well, that I knew LeMay, anil that
I wasn't going to do his dirty work for him. We were rolng to justify
our programs to Congress and let the Air Force justify theirs, McNamara

Contrary to popular conceptions (of the Importance of conflict
during the Cuban Crisis), it appears that Admiral Anderson's final
falling out with McNamara was over the TFX, particularly Anderson's
refusal to remain muzzled over an issue which he felt was a question of
life and death, and over which McNamara wanted him to place the cloak of
confusion.' It was not an honorable thing to do (and It didn't serve
the Navy's purposes). Therefore Anderson did not submit a statement for
clearance by McNamara before he testified before the McClellan subcom-
79
mittee which was investigating the contract award for the TFX, 7 Since
was not happy about my refusal." Appendix (b), answer #10.
One of many interesting questions this statement brings to mind is
whether or not this setback caused McNamara any political problems with
his allies in the DoD, if in fact many of them were oriented toward
sympathy for Air Force positions in general.
78. Admiral Anderson had lost two close male relatives in Navy aircraft
accidents and had a son who was a test pilot. As to his personal views
on the TFX and McNamara' s directives on the subject--
McNamara made a snap judgement, he thought he'd make
points with the President and the Vice President, who
was Lyndon Johnson, and he made a mistake, He hadn't
even read the report (evaluation). McNamara didn't
come back to either the Navy or LeMay to discuss the
issue. McNamara put out the word that his decision
was to be justified no matter who got hurt if they
got in the way, I told everyone in the Navy that It
was going to be a big issue and that I wanted every-
one to stick to their own area of expertise, to
avoid speculation and to stick to the facts, Korth
went into a rage when I refused, to follow McNamara'
s
line, (Appendix (B), answer //ll)
79. Admiral Russell identified the testimony as being critical
—
(Y)ou remember how Admiral Anderson got fired. The
whole problem was over some testimony before a
Committee on the Hill. All the members of the
Secretary's sta rf were: sitting around with sharpened
pencils waiting for a copy of his statement and he
told them he didn't have one, he was just r;oing up
there to tell the truth (about the TFX), Then
McNamara sent (Secretary of the Navy) Korth out to
the Observatory on a Sunday morning to tell Anderson
that he was fired. On a Sunday morning when Anderson

his remarks were critical, and since KcNamara had already demonstrated
(to the point of a constitutional conflict) that he was determined to
censure all military speeches, both for tone and content, the die was
cast. 80
In recalling the issue, it seems impossible to overemphasize the
importance of the Navy's TFX conflict with KcNamara, To quote one CNO
—
You don't realize the bitterness that had been
engendered by the TFX fight. The TFX was more than
5Q& of our problems with KcNamara. You don't insult
a man's baby daughter. The atmosphere of hatred
affected everything else. *
was getting ready for an afternoon party for various
members of different staffs, Korth came out to tell
him he was fired. Anderson immediately called
Kennedy who didn't know anything about it. Anderson
was really deeply hurt. He went in to see KcNamara
about it the next morning and KcNamara came across
his room with his hand out and Anderson put his hand
behind him and sairl , "No, Mr. Secretary, you have
deeply hurt me, I always have believed that a man
should be able and required to toll the truth."
Anyway there was quite some talk about the firing and
KcNamara told Kennedy that if the President appointed
Anderson to anything in the Continental United States
that he, KcNamara, would resign. So Kennedy offered
Anderson the Ambassadorship to Portugal. Anderson
asked for k8 hours to think it over, Burke advised
him not to take it, that it was time to make a stand,
and not to take anything from them, but Adrn, Claude
Ricketts was the VCNO and he advised Anderson to
take it because he could do the country some good as
an Ambassador. Anderson took Ricketts advice and
Burke was furious.
Other accounts which have Identified this testimony as critical are
those by Norris, op. cit. j an editorial in The Evening Star (Washington)
of Hay 19^3, p. A-13;~and "KcNamara-And orson Rifts Led to Ouster,"
Aviat i on Week and Space Tec hnology (13 Kay 1963)
, p, 26,
80. For an account of KcNamara' s censorship of over 1500 military
speeches and the resulting Congressional Investigation (which determined
that President Kennedy's claim of executive privilege to not disclose
who had made "silly" changes was valid) in late 196l -early 19^2, see
Trewhltt, op. cit .. pp. 92ff.

When the Secretary of the Navy conspicuously walked out in the
middle of Anderson's next public speech, the lines of battle were firmly
drawn (perhaps etched is a more descriptive phrase) between the civilians
in the DoD and the Navy. Anderson was ignomiously fired a few days
later. 82
There was another Navy fly in McNamara's control ointment, one
whose speeches he could also not edit and whom he could not fire—Admiral
Rickover. In fact, Rickover's close association with Congress and his
obvious technical successes (Nautilus and Polaris) which had been bally-
hooed by the previous administration for their own political purposes,
81. Admiral McDonald, Appendix (c), answer #6. One can look at the
chronology and speculate on the relationship of the TFX problem to the
carrier decisions.
82. Discussion of Korth's departure from a Navy League awards luncheon
during Anderson's speech on the requirement for both loyalty down and up
the chain of command, see Jack Anderson, "Navy League's Backwash," The
Washi ngton Post (20 May 1963), p. B20.
For even more widely-read comments on the firing see "Guys Who Got
in Their Way " Time (17 May 1963), p. 28; "He Had Better Be Right," Time
(31 May I963), p. 18 (the He in the title refers to HcNamara); and
"Adamant Admiral," Time (21 June 1963), p. 19.
For a statement that Admiral Anderson sent out to the Navy on 10
May to still the rising criticism (and which, in addition to his actions
in taking the Ambassadorship) speaks volumes about Anderson's personal
belief in "loyalty up") see Department of Defense directorate for News
Services (Washington) press release No. N-46-63 of 10 May 1 963
—
I note with considerable concern the speculation as to
possible reasons for the decision to limit my term to
two years. I would, therefore, Implore you to avoid
any remarks, comments, or assumptions relating thereto.
Let me assure each and every man in the naval service
. that our Commander in Chief has made clear to me not
only his confidence in our naval leadership but his
pride in our service. It would, therefore, be
unbecoming of the naval profession to engage in any
actions or reactions which could do damage to our
sorvlco reputations — collective and individual —
as well as to the prestige of the Armed Forces of
these United States and of our civilian leadership.

made Rickover practically invulnerable from reproach. The only way that
the DoD could even "lay a glove on him" was by withholding Congression-
ally appropriated funds and/or by fighting in Congress programs that
Rickover sponsored (and which would fall under his jurisdiction, thus
tending, if anything, to increase his political clout). ^
If the suggestions as to McNamara' s interest in controlling the
military are valid, and if he were felt that the Navy was not responding
as quickly as the other services to his guidance, is it feasible that he
was not uninterested in an opportunity to reemphasize "civilian control?"
Oh
One wonders what the first opportunity was.°^
83. At least one of the major actors specifically identified this
relationship-
Admiral Rickover had a powerful position with Congress.
This infuriated McNamara, but McNamara couldn't get
Rickover because of his power position with Congress,
Since he couldn't get Rickover, he went after us
(the rest of the Navy), Appendix (B), answer #4,
I think that if McNamara was irritated by Anderson's relatively
mild criticism, it is reasonable to expect that he might find Rickover'
s
pointed remarks at least equally offensive.
&l. It is also instructive to note that it was not possible to "hit at"
both Rickover and the "rest of the Navy" through the submarine building
program because, as will be discussed later, the rest of the Navy was
not thrilled by the current program and would have welcomed any cutback,
no matter who caused it. This left the nuclear-powered surface ship
building program. In addition to the nuclear-powored carrier which, as
we have seen, McNamara foupht in Congress, one should remember that
Congress authorized a nuclear-powered frigate in the summer of I963
which McNamara thwarted by a consistent refusal to release th*: fumln to
the Navy, For McNamara' s explanation to Congress of his reason for
cancelling the DLGN and the RASC questioning;, see the Mi l ' tary For; lure
Hearings of 1063 . op., clt . . pp. 530, 918-921, 924-5 and 900.

After inquiring as to whether or not the Secretary may have had
interests in the carrier decision (in addition to the ones that were
made part of the public record on the controversy) it seems logical to
ask the same question with respect to the Navy stand on the subject.
Was the Navy's obvious reluctance to make a capital 1 issue over the
carrier power plant due to the weakness of their case, their misunder-
standing of the uses of systems analysis, or possibly a third (or fourth,
of fifth) reason?
It doesn't take too careful a review of the events of that period
to determine that the Navy had other problems than the carrier which
they felt took priority over Admiral Rickover's power plant.
The first was money. Despite all of McNamara's protestations to
the contrary (footnote #53) » all "the people who were associated with the
preparation of the budget, both on the Navy and SECDEF staffs, wafe^aware
that money was a real constraint. The Navy realized that whether or not
the administration philosophically believed "we can afford any defense
this country needs, "°5 it was not feasible to "need" any more than was
currently politically available. As Admiral Burke phrased it
—
What so many people don't realize is that the Couniry
'has a limited amount of money. The amount of money
you spend is absolutely critical. McNamara was wrong
on a lot of things, but not on that one. Nuclear
power cost a lot of wpney which then wasn't available
for other things.... 86
One must recall, too, that the Navy was in a particular money crunch.
The Navy had developed a strategic weapon system which wa3 invaluable
(both to the Nation's deterrent force posture and to stave off Air Force
claims to the whole strategic responsibility), however, the Navy had not
85, As phrased by Mr, McNamara in JCAE, 19o3 Hrarinp-.s . on . c ij_ . , p. L6l,
B61 Appendix (A), answer /A, paragraph 2.

"been given sufficient extra funds to pay for the submarines, but was
simply having to pay for them from the funds that were normally used to
pay for modernization of the surface force. The rise in (Congressional)
popularity of the tactical submarine had only accentuated this problem.
To fully appreciate the significance of this problem, review footnote
#53 and Appendix (E) and note that not only had the Navy not received
any greater amount of the DoD (read as Air Force) Strategic funds with
which to construct the Pilaris system (as the McNamara system theoret-
ically worked), the Navy's total budget allotted to ship construction
and conversion was shrunk proportionally, and only two-thirds of that
decrease was due to a lesser strategic funding in McNamara' s f 'rst
"budget year (FYI963). By comparison of the number and types of ships
that were requested per year, it appears evident that submarines were
being built at the expense of surface ships (funded from the "Other
Warships" column)
.
The Navy was tied into this problem so tightly that they couldn't
even complain too loudly, since Burke's first decision upon taking office
in 1955 had been to go for the Polaris program,"' and^ his Vice Chief,
DO
Russell, was known as the primary motivational force behind the system,
it was bureiiucratically difficult for the Navy to draw attention to their
dilemma. It is perhaps significant that when both had been relieved,
87. For the official description history of the Fleet Ballistic Missile
Program, see Harvey M. Sapolsky, Tlv pol ar Is System .Development, (Cam-
bridge J Harvard University Press, 1 97X ) . The description of Admiral
Burke's critical hand in the decision process Is contained on p, 21,
88, See Appendix (D), answer ill. For more detailed descriptions see
Vincent Davis, The Politics of Innovation
,
( Denver 1 University of
Denver. 10.67.). Eft, 37fft or Sapoloky, ' ', cit,. pp. 19ff
•

the next CNO moved quickly to cut the programmed number of Polaris
submarines and free some funds for the rest of the Navy. 9
While the money problem for the Navy was primarily due to the
strategic and submarine building program in the early sixties, it should
be noted that this problem did not go away when the Polaris building
program was paid for, for by that time the armed forces were under the
money crunch of the President's Vietnam war policy. When questioned
about whether the lack of surface ships in new construction was related
to the nuclear carrier, the CNO in the latter half of the McNamara tenure
answered--
No. The whole thing was a matter of money, . .
,
McNamara was trying to hold the budget down. Johnson
didn't want the public to know how much it was
costing.... McNamara was telling him what Johnson
wanted to hear when Bob told him it could be done
out of stockpiles and then rebuilt over a long
period. The President was interested in domestic
politics.... he had always said that when he got to a
position of responsibility, he was going to do some-
thing for the poor people, and when he got there he
89. Admiral Anderson was very concerned about the amount of the Navy
budget strategic forces were controlling-
Polaris was the most forward looking portion of the
strategic forces, because of the invulnerability of
the forces. But it was expensive. We had an under-
standing (with the Secretary of Defense) that the
cost of Polaris would not come out of the tactical
Navy's budget, McNamara' s talk about money not being a
a restriction was a lot of hogwash. Money was always
a restriction. Polaris and Poseiden both came out
of the tactical forces' budget..., We had cut the
program of ^5 Polaris submarines to 'U in order to
equalize the distribution of funds throughout the
Navy (primarily to free fun's to fix up the surface
ship missile program).

was saddled with that war that he couldn't get out
of. 90
So, to provide the Navy with one approach-avoidance conflict, there
was the problem of money. The Navy's problem throughout the sixties was
a need for money now. Not a need for money in the pvent of a
declared
war, and not money which would be saved over the next ten or thirty
years by a more cost-effective carrier. The Navy needed the extra money
which they were required to spend at the beginning of the construction
period of a nuclear carreer (and which they would only have to spend
over the next thirty years to support a conventional one). Is this
reason enough to explain Roherty's observed "noticeable ambivalence
in
the Navy attitude."
Possibly there was another factor. Which was the more important
issue for the Navy to win, the TFX or the carrier power plant? To
answer
that from the Navy's point of view, one only needs to examine Arleigh
Burke's discussion of sea-based air power—
'
90. Admiral McDonald, Appendix (c), answer /A. By reading the
remainder
of the McDonald interview, one receives the impression that he was
particularly sympathetic to President Johnson's domestic political
problems and considerations. If that perception is true, might it
reasonably be extrapolated that during this period the Navy would, he
more reluctant than' usual to adopt any policy that might cause the
President political problems (such as asking for more money for a nuclear-
powered carrier)?
91. One should not forget that a "cost-effective" solution to a
problem
can easily cost a great deal more initially than a solution which would
bo much poorer in the short run. It seoms to bo human and /or bureau-
cratic nature to honestly believe that money will be easier next year {ex
the year after). The interaction of these two factors generally seems to
push decision-makers in A he direction of the solution which requlros
smaller this-year costs, a position held by the conventional carrier
J ± A ^~

there were a great number of "favors" which were in the perogative of
the Secretary of Defense to make, which were difficult to contest, and
which the Navy considered important. 95 When all of these conflicting
desires were placed in the balance, it appears that the Navy decided to
seek a truce, and the nuclear power plant was offered as a token of
their sincerity
—
The problem with analysis at this time was that he
had the power of the computer behind him. He could
do a great number of analysis very fast, each time
varying the inputs. He could provide rapid compari-
sons. The problem of course was that each time he
got garbage out because he put garbage in. The
reason it was garbage is because what is needed for
defense of the country is only an estimate. It is
only a feel, that you acquire. You can't analyze or
quantify it, it's a feel.
Appendix (a), answer #3i paragraph 2.
95* For an excellent example, and one that may have some application to
the controversy of interest, Admiral McDonald described an incident that
probably occurred in the Spring of 19^
—
Let me give you an example of the need for rapport
with the Secretary of Defense. When it was time to
name a new CINCPAC, I was completely outvoted in the
JCS, Even the Commandant of the Marine Corps voted
against me....(l)t was important that the Navy got
that job. I didn't think the war was going to last
forever, and when it was over the other services
weren't 'going to be interested in that area. So I
went to McNamara and told him I wanted Shar~ in that
job but the rest of the Chiefs were voting for the
Air Force man. McNamara told ms he'd take care of
it and he did so, despite the combined votes of the
Chiefs. The only problem was that then I owed the •
son of a bitch a favor.
Appendix (c), answer //3, last paragraph.
The Navy's success in this Instance, in which the Navy lnlti the
"scratch my bark, I'll..." soquence must bo contrasted with the
of October 19f>3 in which the Navy had loc.t joint milH aponsiblllty
(control) of the Middle East/lndlan O. in area to the Air Force, For
accounts of the latter sec the "Whiz Kid" U.S. News report, • ..''.. or,
for a more analytical account, soc Hannon W. Baldwin, "The Korth Ri
nation," The New York Timor- . 15 October 1 9^>3 • P. 33.

I looked at my job as one of pouring oil on troubled
waters. The Navy and the Secretary of Defense had ;.
gotten so far apart the Navy was not going to get
anything. All communications had. broken down. I
know many people felt that I was kow-towing and they
were right, I vrould have kissed McNamara' s^^ __ at
high noon if I thought it would help to smooth things
over and there were many times I felt I had....The
fellow who saici he would rather be right than Presi-
dent was never President, ., .1 felt we needed a deck
....I remember talking in his office with Pastori
and he sairi, Admiral, you are settling for a slice
and we are trying to give you a whole loaf. I said,
Yes, but we're awfully hungry..., I believed that the
time had come for nuclear power but I also believed
that we wouldn't get a nuclear CVA-6? without at
least a delay of one year. Actually we never would
have gotten the carrier. If we had made an issue and
fought McNamara, he would have delayed the carrier,
and we would have had to fight the battle again the
next year and the next year and the next. Time was
important.' We needed the carrier. In the end,
McNamara went along with me. There was no change in
analysis, McNamara just became convinced that the
Navy was not his enemy. In addition, it was possible
at the time to advocate the conventional power plant
without arguing against nuclear power.
There were a hell of a lot of things on my mind that
were more important than the nuclear carrier.""
While the foregoing may or may not be an explanation for the Navy's
ambiguity on the issue, what possible reasons could be offered for the
Secretary's change in position on the carrier's power plant issue?
The first one is the one Admiral McDonald noted in the last para-
graph. McNamara no longer felt that the Navy was threatening him person-
ally on the issue of civilian control. In addition, the Navy had paid
the proper acknowledgement to the science of System Analysis by finally
establishing their own system analysis center and putting In charge an

Officer who had worked on both McNamara 'a own staff and the Secretary of *
the Navy's and was trusted by both. 9?
Another possible reason is that the carrier issue had become a
political liability for the Democratic party during the off year elec-
tions of 1964, and President Johnson's moves to defuse this potential
Issue had virtually locked McNamara into approving the nuclear power
plant. As an indication of the Republican attempt early in the election
year to make the carrier issue a political one there is the Republican
move in the house to introduce mandatory legislation to embarrass the
Administration on the issue. 98 In addition, Johnson's moves to counter
the Goldwater charges "of military lethargy" resulted in McNamara announc-
ing a new R&D project to improve the carrier reactor design, and the
President confirming and embroidering on that theme as the campaigning
heated up, 99
97. Apparently the Navy was somewhat reluctant to acknowledge that they
needed any additional capability in this area, and, after delaying as
long as possible in even agreeing to work with OSD/SA, the first Navy
Pentagon System Analysis group was finally established by SBCNAV in his
organization more than two and one-half years af'er McNamara took office.
After another year, that group still had only nine officers, of wh'ch
only four h"d (any) post-graduate training. The Office of Naval Opera-
tions had not yet established its own specific group in the OSl'i/SA Image.(RADM Draper L. Kauffman in the "Comment and Discussion" section of the
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings
. August 1964, pp. 121-3).
The Officer who was assigned, to head the OPNAV office when it was
established was RADM Zumwalt.
98. John W. Finnoy, "G.O.P. Bills Back Atomic Carrier," The Now York
Times
. 6 February 1964, p. 7.
99. Max Frankel, "President Hails Missile Progress," The New York Til
6 September 1964, p. 27. The President invoked the Image of Ad
Rlckover (perhaps making Rickover jjx?fo bureaucrat icnlly more difficult.
for the SECDHF to attack) and promised a nuclear carrier in the "19
time frame, dependent upon the development pace of the two reader power
plant.
For a view on how the decision war. arrived at, on the LIU ranch,
sans analysts, see Atmendix CC). answer i/k. last narmrra nh
.

A third possible explanation might be that McNamara had so many
potential conflicts with Confess during the last quarter of his tenure,
all of which were more important to him than the carrier, that there was
ample incentive to reduce the number of balls which he was trying to
maintain in the air at any one time. If one were to try to determine if
a list of important items could be constructed, perhaps the following
would be included:
Vietnam—the administration had decided to go into Vietnam in
earnest and Congressional support was essential. Large scale bombing
of the North had started in February and in defense of the administra-
tion's actions and policy, KcNamara found it necessary to downplay the
importance of carrier vulnerability that he had found so critical two
years earlier
—
I do not think there is any real danger to our
carriers from the North Vietnamese. I do not think
they have in the (r>ic) their power to seriously
damage and certainly not to sink one of the carriers
1 nobecause of the way they are constructed.
Impoundment of funds--Congress had not gotten used to the loss of
power over the Services programs (to Secretary McNamara), and they cer-
tainly were not happy with the Administration's continued flouting of
the Congressional will through the impounding of funds appropriated for
specific weapon's systems. Congress felt that this policy had reached
new heights of Imprudence under the Kennedy-Johnson administrations.
President Kennedy had talked the Congress out of a direct confrontation
on this issue once before in (the Rose Garden walk), but Congressional
resentment was building up again, and Admiral Rickover war. in there
100. Senate Appropriations Committer- 19 /^. Hearing on Military A- < [<
at Ions. (S-2-8), 89th Congress, 1st Session, (Washington I 5iO, i
P. 3^2.

chipping away at the blocks, constantly, but respectfully reminding
Congress that McNamara was openly flouting the will of Congress, and was
proud of it. 101
The B-70—McNamara still was not about to approve this expensive
program which had considerable congressional backing. It was this
controversy that had been the issue of Kennedy's Rose Garden walk with
Vinson three years earlier. In 1964, McNamara had finally come out pub-
lically against the project. Hearings this year would be predictably
brutal. 102
The C5A—McNamara had overruled the service source selection board
(shades of the TFX) and awarded the contract to Lockheed-Georgia rather
than Boeing (Seattle). McNamara' s staff felt the C5A was going to be
the best "exhibit" to date 'of the effectiveness and validity of the
101. For an example of Rlckover's patient, careful attack, see the
exchange on pp. 12 and 13 of "Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program," JCAE,
1966 Hearings
.
89th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, GPO, 1966).
102. For one discussion on tho B-70 controversy, see Trewhitt, on. pit,.
np. 120ff. For what proports to be the system analysis one, see Enthoven
and Smith, op., cit .. pp. 243-&51 . Note that if Robert J. Art, Tho TFX
Decision
.
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1^68) is correct when he reports that
the TFX decision was not tho result of elaborate system analysis, because
the system analysis office had
—
neither the services nor his staff as yet (in 196?.)
had the resources to produce what he would have
considered valid estimates of aircraft development
and production costs
and therefore McNamara had to rely on "rough judgements' unsupported by
detailed analysis" (both quotes from p. I65), then perhaos the B-70 we
also not the result, of "system analysis," but only a "roUflh judgement,"
for Admiral Anderson has roported that McNamara had made his decision on
tho B-70 as ear'.y as Decem^or 196l (before the TFX decisions Art dJ ss)i
Soo footnote #77).

cost-effectiveness technique, bu +. some people expected Senator Jackson
to question some of the decisions that had "been made, ^
The ABM—McNamara was against deployment of the system and had
marshalled up technological reasons until 1964 to argue against the




There appeared to be a great deal of sentiment in Congress for deploy-
ment. 10^
Relations with Congress—McNamara' s relationship with Congress had
been steadily deteriorating since President Kennedy's death, if not
before. If nothing else, one would expect the normal amount of resentment
that grows over the space of two Presidential terms, but there is some
indication that McNamara' s confident presentations, whVch had initially
been received so well by the Congress, were being accepted reluctantly,
if not with some misgivings as to either/or their accuracy and validity.
The succession of Representative Rivers to the chairmanship of the House
Armed Service Committee, and his public pledges to bring McNamara under
control, at whatever expense was necessary, could have provided McNamara
or President Johnson with a reason to seek retrench some of the Executive/
Legislative relationship, ^
103, For a polemic j-superficial and misleading (but the most referenced)
account, see Berkeley Rice, The C5A Scandal . (Bostoni Houghton Mifflin,
1971 ), For an account which is not as complete, bu* Is more convincing
in describing McNamara's bureaucratic ties to tho program, see A. lw-nrr.t
Fitzgerald, The High Priests nf Wastn , (New Yorki W. W. Norton, 1972),
especially his preliminary comments on pp. 3~50.
1 04. llalperin, "Decision to Deploy the ABM," on. cit. For another
account, see John Newhouse, Cold Dawn, (New Yorki Holt, Rind.art and
Winston, 1973), PP. 74-00.

10(S£ First, it Is of interest to note that President Johnson had "been a
member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy before he had accepted
the Vice Presidential nomination and the Committee Chairman was not
above using those ties. As early as December 1963, he had begun to
remind the President of those ties and of the Committee's conviction on
the carrier issue ( l 967-68 Hearings , p_o. cit., p. 262).
Secondly, the reviewing of any of McNamara's testimony in the
Congress dating approximately from the death of President Kennedy,
indicates that at least some members of the Congress were becoming
somewhat irritated with the attitude of superiority of "rightiousness"
which they felt the Secretary had adopted in his relationship with the
Congress, For what became a more typical exchange with the further
passage of time, see House Armed Services Committee, 1 964 Hearings on
Military Posture (No. 36), 88th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington: ^ GPO, t
1964), pp. 7107ff. on the question of McNamara's claimed "savings." For
a quick overlook, see "Rough Days Ahead for Secretary McNamara?" U.S..
Ngws_& World Report ,' 8 November 1965. P. 24.
Thirdly, there appears to be little question that Mendel Rivers was
determined to obtain McNamara's attention to what Congress was trying to
tell him about the Constitutional perogatlves of the respective branches
of Government. There is an early article "New House Foe Fires on McNamara,'
in Business Week , 3 July 1965, pp. 24-5 which describes this political
fight, and it appears that by the end of the year Rivers had decided
that the only way to get the Executive's attention was by the same method
the proverbial farmer uses with his oxen. In early November of the same
year, Rivers had threatened to take some action unless the nuclear power
controversy was settled—
I urge that you give consideration to establishing a .
policy of utilizing nuclear propulsion in all future
major surface warships for the U.S. Navy. In the
view of our committee, the Department, of Defense has
been extremely dilatory in establishing such a
policy. I fear that this much-needed policy will
not be established without your direct intervention,
or that of the Congress, (reprinted in JCAE, 1 967-
68 Hearings , op . cit . , pp. 28lff.)
By December, Rivers had nublically announced that there would be NO
FY6? \
unless McNamara mended his ways. He had also announced how he would
prevent the passage of this budget. (George C. Wilson, Rivers Renews
Drive to Curb McNamara," Aviation Week and Stklc o Technology., 17
January
'
'For an* excellent discussion/comparison of Rivers handling of tl
HASC see John T. Whelan, "Some Conditions Affecting Continuity and
Change
in Congressional Committee Involvement In Defense Policy. The Cas<
the House Committee of Armed Services," (unpublished Doctor n disserta-
tion, University of Pittsburg, 1072).
Finally, It has been often reported that President Johnson wa 1
much
more sensitive than his predecessor to Congressional opinion,
partlcul




For Johnson, certain of his former colleagues on th
S.n«i>.« constituted a major reference group on national

Before summarizing my conclusions on the issue, I think it is
significant to note the manner in which the different CNOs represented
different and/or consistent viewpoints with respect to the carrier power
plant and Mr. McNamara and the effect this had on the CVA-67 controversy.
Admiral Burke (pre-196l)—appears to have been more interested in
the problems of maintaining the maximum possible surface ship and tactical
air capability as was feasible in the money crunch caused by the demands
of the building strategic and tactical nuclear submarine programs. He
did not feel that additional funds were politically available for the
nuclear power plant for a carrier, and he did not have sufficient funds
available to volunteer to absorb the additional costs.
Admiral Anderson (196I-63)—was concerned with the immediate monetary
demands of the nuclear power plant, but he was even more concerned with
the conceptual changes in the relationship between the DoD managerial
team and the Services. It appears that his reluctance to compromise his
personal and professional principles prevented him from successfully
adapting to the changing political environment and produced a situation
in which the Navy directly challenged the Secretary of Defense, in a
manner, 1 and with results, similar to those of 19^9.
Admiral McDonald (1963-67)—was concerned more with the political
cost of the nuclear power plant. He recognized the futility of any
direct or indirect Navy effort which appeared to bR an attack on the
Secretary or his office. Since the nuclear carrier had become such an
security matters. He had had a close relation with
Richard Russell, who was Chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee...
and was from +he same small town in Georgia as tho Chief of Nava] ! r-
atlons, who, despite his denials, appears to have been (to be?) a
politician, (see Appendix (C), answer in, paragraph 6, nnd answer /' .

Is re ho Hi.ll!.ngly avoided any short-term efforts in this controversy
in order to achieve gains in the larger arena of Navy-SBCDEF relations.
Th :: policy proved to be effective,, not only in the "big picture," but
al c in achieving specific SECIW support for the carrier nuclear power
plant In this latter success he was assisted by several other bureau-
cxi tic considerations which made it "cost-effective" for Mr. McNarnara to
change his mind on the issue.
liy primary conclusion is that, the nuclear carrier controversy was a
pavn \;hich was moved on the board of events by two major power contro-
versies, one of which was the issue of increased executive branch civilian
control of the military by means of the centralized "McNarnara" system,
•nc the second issue was- the Constitutional relationship between the
Legislative 'and Executive branches.
It is my derivative opinion that one of Roherty's conclusions (and
my initial frame of reference) with respect to the controversy—that the
Wavy suffered at the hands of the McNarnara team primarily because of
"the Navy's indecision about how to react to the criteria arvl technlnues
imposed by the new management. . .followed by clumsiness"—is not supported
y u bureaucratic review of the record, as supplemented by Interviews
with some of the major Navy actors.
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Interview with Admiral Arleigh Burke, USN (ret), (Chief of Naval
Operations from 1955-1961 ) conducted on 3 May 197^ from 1050 to 1150 in
room 310 at 101 5 18th Street, N.W. Sketchy notes were taken. This para-
phrasion was reconstructed from memory beginning at I63O on 3 May 197^.
Q. 1 . An author named Rourke has 'written of the nuclear power for the
CVA-67 conflict and has noted that the problem was that "the Navy did not
enter into the fray with its customary assuredness." Is that what you
perceived as happening?
A. 1. No. What do you need a carrier for--to provide mobile air power
for concentration at a specific point. What do you need to obtain that?
You need the aircraft. You need living quarters for the men, you need
defensive units to protect you against submarines and you need some kind
of pronulsion plant. You don't need nuclear power. You do need all of
the rest. Nuclear power is nice but it costs money. When the ouestion
of nuclear power came up apain, following the Enterprise, I went over to
Congress and interviewed a great number of Congressmen. I couldn't get
sufficient support for the nuclear carrier to enable it to pass, but I
thought I could get sufficient support for a conventional one. So I took
what I could, get and I think that it was the proper thine, to do.
What so many people don't realize is that the Country has a
limited amount of money. The amount of money you spend is absolutely
critical. McNamara was wronp: on a lot of things, but not on that one.
Nuclear power cost a lot of money which then wasn't available for other
things . There are even occasions in which you do not need carriers.
There are occasions in which a conventional submarine will do as pood a
job as a nuclear one. They are ouieter, for instance. Eut if you have
to have just one kind, nuclear submarines are better. The best thine to
have is a mix, but Congress would not let me buy any conventional sub-
marines. I would have, but they wouldn't have let me.
The basic problem that a CNO has is how to pet the maximum combat
capability. Some capabilities are necessary, seme are pood and some are
just nice to have. The ouestion the CNO is always asking hiirself is "Can
I take less and will it serve to accomplish the tasks?"
The advances since then in nuclear power have, of cour.se, changed
the situation. I, of course, am talking a^out the increase in core life.
At the time, you must remember that in full combat the ammunition runs
out about the same time as the fuel. .Not all the time, but sometimes.
Sinpe you have to resupply with Ammo, you might as well resupply with
fuel.
Q. 2.. How did you react to Representative Cannon's anti-Carrier speech
in Congress? Was that sentiment wide spread?
A. 2. There was some anti-carrier sentiment. It was our own fault. We
oversold carriers like the Air Force oversold bombers. Carriers can't do
everything and. they don't last forever. We had zealots that maintained
they could and all this did was irritate the Air Force advocates and
others who knew that the carrier wasn't the complete answer everytime.

Q. 3. How did you feel McNamara and his immediate staff were oriented
on the question of land-based versus sea-based tactical air power when
they came into office?
A. 3. They weren't oriented toward anything. They were interested in
getting control of the military. They were young. They didn't know
their ass from a tin cud about the military, strategy or world problems.
After a while they learned some of the arguments that were being used and
they used the same arguments to try to get control. They wanted simple,
single answers. They wanted an answer that couldn't be disproved, so
they emphasized the need for a nuclear capability. That that would solve
everything and was the answer. System analysis was the tool they used to
cet control. Ther^ was such a thine: as cost effectiveness long before
McNamara. There always had been analysis, and particularly so before the
McNamara era.
The problem with analysis at this time was that he had the power
of the computer behind him. He could do a great number of analyses very
fast, each tine varying the imputs. He could provide rapid comparisons.
The problem, of course, was that each time he got garbage out because he
put garbage in. The reason it was garbage is because what is needed for
defense of the country is only an estimate. It is only a feel that you
acquire. You can't analyze or quantify it, it's a feel.
When McNamara came in with his computers, I took a course at IBM
so that I could talk with him. I thus was prepared to discuss what was
going on. The problem is that the use of analysis is often done cynically.
It is done in order to prove something which you have already decided on.
It doesn't take anyone too smart to determine that that's not the right
way to do something. Look at the DLGN which has twin anti-air missile
launchers and no surface to surface missile capability. A high-school
boy should be able to see that that's stupid. Look at the ships where we
are havinff mutinies. It doesn't take anyone too smart to say look at the
other ships. If they are in the same shape, they certainly aren't in any
shape to fie-ht. It doesn't +ake analysis to tell you that.
The Air Force was pushing air power at McNamara. They either did
not have the wisdom nor the integrity, one or the other, to realize that
that was not the whole answer, that it was wrong. They built up a stock
of civilian experts. That was what Rand was, and then several years later
we decided to match them and that was a mistake. Now we don't have a
code of ethics. We are no longer professional. We are at the mercy of
people who do not have responsibility. We are dependent upon tons of
paper and analysis, which we can't do, and which produces answers which
our decision-makers don't understand, and which the people who make the
decisions do not have the experience in order to make accurate decisions.
If the Navy is worth a damn, we should be able to determine our own
requirements. We have lost BUSHIPS, we have lost our intelligence, etc.
An example is the surface to surface missile. It was evident 10 or 15
years aro^ to a high school boy that we needed surface to surface missiles.
I started the Development of the missile that we're working on today
(HARPOON) and it's still k to 5 years from deployment. Something is wrong
with our system. The Soviets have deployed a dozen different kinds. We
should have, too. Hell, our first one shou]ri be obsolete by now. Instead
we don't even ha'/e one, and I find out that it is so complicated that
it's programmed to operate differently dependent upon which ocean It's
in. What happens if the ship changes oceans?

The major problem with the system is that we over-study and over-
analyze. I'm against making studies that you don't intend to accent. I
assigned some studies out when I already knew the answers sometimes, in
order to get some civilians to understand the Navy problems, but I never
encouraged dishonest reports, reports which I intended to discard if they
didn't come ut> with the answers I wanted. You can't have yes-men. You
probably won't get in trouble in the first generation, but in the second
generation of yes-men, you have a groun that can't make decisions. You
can't fire people who don't come un with the answers you want. You have
to be able to fight honestly. You 'can't cheat at analysis, even when you
know the other sine is cheating, and retain your integrity. You may be
able to, but others will be misled. I am often amazed at the integrity
of civilians. We would like to have Bill Martin on this board I am on.
After he retired from the FED, he said he would have to wait a year and
then after a- year he said that he would have to wait a while longer
because he had a conflict of interest. And no one suggested that he come
anyway because everyone knew that, even if he didn't have a conflict, if
he thought he did, he did.
I selected my VCNOs because they were tough. I had a fight with
Russell every morning of the week. I got a lot of unpleasant advice from
them, times when he felt I was wrong. I overrode him lots of times, and
also there were lots of times when I didn't do things because he opposed
them. I knew we were both dedicated to 'the same ideal, the security of
the Country, so I knew there was good reason behind his opposition. You
need opposition within an organization. The most damaging thing a sub-
ordinate can do is not to tell his boss when he is wrong. The reason for
a Vice Chief is because he is loyal to a cause but not the methods.
The hardest thing I have to do is tell my wife when she's wrong.
She has ruined many a car engine because she doesn't know how to start
it. She always floods it. I should have told her long ago but it wasn't
worth it to me. Now I can't because she doesn't believe me, but she's
still ruining car engines.
The problem today is that we don't know the difference between
right and wrong with respect to the way of doing things.
You know McNamara was a quick learner. You had to react immedi-
ately. "If you didn't hit) him in the bud, he was long gone down whatever
lost trail he was chasing. I got to my office about seven. McNamara
learned that I did and he began doing so. I used to go down to see him
two or three times a week in order to touch ^ase. I really thought he
was quite a fellow at first. Sometimes he would come up to my office and
we'd talk.. One day I asked him if I could see an analysis which I was
sure he had. He said, "sure, you can see any analysis I have." I said,
"Could I see the analysis that you did on your wife before you married
her?" Well, he was furious and turned away and walked off without saying
a word. I found out later that I had really hit a sore point. When he
first went to Michigan, he had been going with a girl but she got polio
and he dumped her because he didn't think she could help him. He really
has a swell wife now. I really hit a sore point.
Reconstruction completed at 1820,
3 May 1974.





Interview with Admiral George W. Anderson, Jr. USN (ret.)i Chief of
Naval Operations from 1961-1 963, currently Chairman of the Presi-
dent's Intelligence Advisory Board. Interview conducted in Room
300 of the Executive Office Building, on 22 April 197^, from 10^5
to 1135* This paraphrasion was reconstructed from my recollection
and notes of the interview, was produced commencing about 1230 of
the same day.
Q. #1 . What happened with respect to the nuclear power for the CVA-67
controversy?
A. #1, The cost for the 8-reactor carrier (like the Enterprise) was
excessive—about one-half a billion and rising. We could get a non-
nuclear carrier for $31 0M (and rising). The lead time on the nuclear
carrier was long (excessive). In order to get the CV, I had to acce-ot
a conventionally powered carrier. I sent word to Rickover that I couldn't
justify an ei^ht reactor carrier, and that he should get busy and design
a modern plant which would cost less and would be less comulicated.
One year later Rickover came un with a four reactor carrier. I
proposed that we now substitute the h reactor carrier for the convention-
ally powered one. McNamara thought I had been conniving behind his back
all along (to get the nucle-.r power plant) so he stuck with his original
decision. I had originally agreed to take the conventional pover plant
and I stuck with my agreement.
As to which is cheaper. . .the long core life and the rising cost
of oil, plus the extra storage space for aviation gas, means that over
the life of the. carrier nuclear power comes very close to being just as
cost effective as conventional power. In addition to that, the flexibility
of being able to onerate without the need for a chain of oilers is
extremely valuable. We should build only nuclear powered carriers. The
major escorts also should be nuclear powered. Rickover should concen-
trate on smaller cores (for surface ships) with bigger outputs. The
carrier is free from -political constraints.
Q. #2. Was your outlook on the Carrier influenced hy Representative
Cannon's avowed opnosition to the Carrier as evidenced by his speeches
in the house in 1959?
A. #2. No, I don't recall Cannon's speech.
Q. #3. What was the relationship of the Navy with Congress?
A. #3. Admiral Rickover had a powerful position with Congress. This
infuriated McNamara, but McNamara couldn't get Rickover because of his
power position with Congress. Since he couldn't get Rickover, he went
after us.

Q. #4. Did you feel Adm. Rickover was cooperating with you and rest of
the Navy?.
A. #4. He didn't bother me (with any actions he might have taken with
the Congress which were not in consonance with other Navy actions).
Q. #5. Despite McNamara's announced "Revolution," if one looks at the
procurement figures for the last years of Eisenhower's reign and the
first ones of Kennedy's, the Navy's total percentage of procurement
remains about the same, and with the building of the increased numbers
of Polaris and attack nuclear submarines, it looks as if they were being
paid for by the national strategic weanon program. Did you think this
was true?
A. #5. Polaris was the most forward looking
-portion of the strategic
forces, because of the invulnerability of the forces. But it was expen-
sive. We had an understanding that the cost of Polaris would not come
out of the tactical Navy's budget. McNamara's talk about money not
beine; a restriction was a lot of hoswash. Money was always a restric-
tion. Polaris and Poseiden both came out of the tactical forces' budget.
The problem now is to ensure that Trident doesn't set the tactical forces
back asrain.
Q. #6. Did the rapid build-up of f-e strategic and tactical nuclear
submarine force in the sixties result in there not being sufficient
funds to build any surface ships for the first five years of McNamara's
reign?
A. #6. I think it was the 1964- budget. We had asked for more nuclear
(attack) submarines and the SECDEF had reduced our request. We had
reclai-<\-6?^- the cut and McNamara had told us no. We had a meeting down
at Palm Beach with the President (the JC3, SECDEF and the President).
The President asked me if I had received enough and I told him no, that
there were five items I needed, some more submarines, some money for
maintenance, and certain aircraft procurement, nlus some other thinp-s.
I told him I was responsible for the Ions-term operation of the Navy,
for the operation today, tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. I told
him we never get enough money, but that in those cases we would l'ke
professional exnerienced naval officers to make the judgement on where
to cut. McNarrara was irritated because he had told the President that
we had enousrh money. Kennedy just smiled. He was backing up his Secre-
tary, and that was risrht.
When I sot before Congress that year, Jerry Ford asked me if I
had what I needed and I told him no and told him what I needed. He
asked me. if I had gone to the Secretary of Defense and to the President.
I told him I had and he said well you've done all you could. I reminded
him of that just the other day.

Q. #7. When you came into office, what was your order of priorities as
to what had to be done? Were you more concerned, about the procurement
problems of the TFX V/STOL, Surface to Surface missiles, Submarines, the
CVA or the CVAN?
A. #7. I came from my job as COMSIXTHFLEET to relieve Arleigh Burke. I
was convinced, the first year that my most important job was to make
everything work. We were getting extremely poor -oerformance from our
guided missiles. I think Burke was right to set them out aboard ship
(before they were completely reliable). The program to fix them up was
expensive (through the 3T "get-well" pro£rram). The second year I empha-
sized the importance o^ people. I feel this is the most important
aspect of the Navy.
We had cut the program of ^5 Polaris submarines to hi in order
to eoualize the distribution of funds throughout the Navy. We couldn't
afford a nuclear carrier at that point.
When I became CNO, I had been prepared better than anyone else
who had held the job within recent years. I had been a Fleet Commander,
had served in both oceans, on the JGS and in OPNAV. I had a very expe-
rienced erroup of deputies. My people at OP-01 , 02, 0^, 05 and 06 had
all had Fleets. I had Admiral Radorn (of Polaris fame) as my OP-07,
which was R&D. I had a wealth of experience. I relied on these people
and I kept in constant contact with the Fleet Commanders. I didn't rely
on a small personal staff as Zumwalt did.
I had good relations with the Secretaries of the Navy. Excellent
relations with Connolly and with Korth until the TFX controversy, and he
was all involved in that one himself.
I had problems with KcNamara's staff. As an example, Enthoven
had a guy working for him who had been in the German Air Force during
the war. His name was Dieter Schwabbs and he couldn't even get a normal
security clearance. Ke spent so much time sending down questions to
answer that we couldn't get any other work done. McNamara was doing so
much that he was encroaching on the legal perogatives of the Secretary
of the Na-y and the CNO.
Q. #8. Was the SECDEF using bureaucratic devices to split up the Navy?
A. #8. The Navy was organized as a bilinial orsanination. This had
worked well during World War II. I was not responsible for procurement.
The Chief of Naval Material reported directly to the Secretary of the
Navy and they were responsible for procurement problems. I set the
reouirements. The Army had been monolithic and they had had a great
deal more problems during the war than had we with procurement. The Air
Force had taken the monolithic structure with them when they sr>lit off
from the Army. McNamara forced the Navy to reor^ani-e on a monolithic
basis. This was a mistake. The Army and Air Force should have adopted
the bilinial system.
I am in favor of giving the military more of a voice in the
operations and plans side of the military. The CJCS should be the
equivalent of a deputy SECuEF for Operations. SECNAV should have to cut
the mustard as a manager of the procurement problems.

Q. #9. Did you feel that the SECDEF and his immediate staff were biased
because of their background?
A. #9. McNamara is a brilliant individual. He had a m : nd which was
statistical. He had two faults, he considered himself infallible and
his judgement was bad.
The Navy's professional talent is based on three factors. The
first is the experienced flag officer, the second is the experienced
Chief Petty Officers, and the third is the young naval officers whom we
snend a great deal training, educating, dedicating to duty, and teaching
them the "can do" spirit. There is always a shortage of ships, aircraft,
maintenance money, etc., but these three factors can offset them. This
is the way we manage to struggle through. This is the most important
factor to maintain in the Navy. This spirit of importance and dedication
is what McNamara did the mos + to destroy in the Navy. I will never
forgive Chaffe and Nitze for bringing in Zurnwalt who got rid of so many
experienced officers who could have been of assistance.
The SECDEF and his assistants didn't know anything about the
Navy. The only thing they knew anything about was the Air Force.
Q. #10. Did you feel that the old questions about carriers which had
been raised in 1949 in the revolt of the admirals were still around to
haunt you? Did you feel that the Air Force was trying to snipe at you?
A.. #10. I didn't get involved in inter-service rivalry. One of the
first things Fred (Korth) brought down to me was the word that McNamara
expected the Navy to carry the freight in Congress lobbying aprainst the
big aircraft, what was it, the B-70. I told Korth that I wouldn't do
it, that I understood the Air Force pretty well, that I knew LeMay, and
that I wasn't goin? to do his dirty work for him. We were going to £<->sH
justify tpur"^ •„ McNamara was not happy about my refusal.
Q. #11. Did you feel the Navy had so many other problems like the TFX
that spending' blue chips on the nuclear carrier was not worth it?
A. #11. Well, the TFX was another story in itself. McNamara made a
snap judgement, he thought he'd make points with the President and the
Vice President, who was Lyndon Johnson (^rom Texas), and he made a mis-
take. He hadn't even read the report (evaluation). McNamara didn't
come back to either the Navy or LeMay to discuss the issue. McNamara
put out the word that his decision was to be justified no matter who got
hurt if they got in the way. I told everyone in the Navy that this was
going to be a hie- issue and that I wanted everyone to stick to their own
area of expertise, to avoid speculation and to stick to the facts.
Korth went into a rage when I refused to follow McNamara 's line.
Q. #12. Did you feel McNamara was a good "political animal."
A. #12. No. He told Congress he was goinp: to do one thing at the very
time he was doing something exactly opposite.

Q. #13« Well, he was successful for several years, wasn't he?
A. #13. Yes.
Q. #14. Did you feel the Navy organized to meet the "system analysis
challenge" from the SECDEF? Did you feel that either of the other
services did better? Was that important?
A. #14. The Navy had been doin."; -system analysis for years. We had used
the "Estimate of the Situation" as a basis for reaching a decision. We
had the OEG as our evaluation group and they were very efficient.
KcNamara may have called it cost-effectiveness but it really was just
the application of operation analysis, and we had operation analyses
representatives/teams with all our fleets. We were using; cost as an
analysis factor. During the war the British did not deploy an airplane,
they accented a slip in operational availability because analysis showed
that an alternate airplane would be more effective for the -pound (cost).
Operation analysis was not new with KcNamara. Cost-e rfectiveness was
just a term. His group of analysts had a tremendous cohesiveness when
they arrived due to their common experience in service at RAND,
The Air Force had supported more of the new "Harvard" people
who are being appointed to positions of responsibility, and they had
supported more of the East-European intellectuals who carr.e to prominence
after the 1960s. Most of the latter had very shallow roots in America.
Q. #15« Do you feel that the Navy should, rely more on contracts with
these people rather than on in-house expertise?
A. #15. No. We have always had a fcreat number of civilians in business
who have Navy experience, such as President Nixon, Vice President Ford,
Doug Dillon, etc. We and the Air Force need to have the expertise
in-house. We should remain true to our principles.
Q. #16. What were, your conclusions about the KcNamara era?
A. #16. KcNamara was the worst thing that could have happened to the
country. Zumwalt has increased the deterioration of the Navy. We have
too much early selection. It takes a great deal of experience to prepare
individuals for the responsibility rank brings, particularly Cantains.
One of the worst things I ever had to do was relieve the skinner of the
Coral Sea. He was making too many errors, the next one would have been
bad for the Navy. I called him directly from the CHO's office and ho
said he had been sitting there waiting for my call. He had been early
selected twice and was an excellent officer, and would have been a
terrific one if he had been permitted the time to mature and rairi experience,
Bud ( Zumwalt) would have been a pood CNO if he had had more sea
experience. He came in here and wanted to take care of all the poor
sailors, the blacks, and he succeeded in undermining the CPOs, one of
those three essential factors in the Navy's success. Then he discarded
the Flag Officers. I never wrote a letter to a Fla^; Officer telling him
I had no job which he could usefully fill (which Zumwalt did).

We gave Tom Moorer even more experience than I had, he was
CINGPAC and then CINCLANT before he was CNO. I just got through with
a study and do you realize that in Eurone all of those flags have prac-
tically no sea command experience at all?
Completed para-phrasing remarks
at 1510 on 22 April 1974.




Interview with Admiral David McDonald, USN (ret), (Chief of Naval
Operations from 1963 to 196?) conducted on 2 Kay 107^ from 1050 to 1220
in an office of the Chief of Naval Material (Crystal Plaza #5). This
paraphrasion was reconstructed from memory and sketchy notes taken at the
time, and was bewn at 1*4-00 on 2 May 197^.
Q. 1. Do you think the Navy has suffered vis a vis the other services
"by not having enough officers schooled in liberal academic subjects so
that we are not as impressive in the political atmosphere of Washington?
A. 1. There is no question about it. Of course, you must remember how
this started. In peacetime, we still had our ships and still steamed, so
we could conduct all the training that was used in wartime, with the
exception of firing the shells, on board the shins at sea. When the first
World War was over the Army couldn't do this. They weren't even mechanized.
The only th ! n<r they had for the men to do was throw manure and cut ccrass.
So they established a bunch of schools to occupy their time. The Air
Corps was brought un in this atmosnhere, and even though they had the
planes to look after, they were used to proinfr to schools. If we send
people to schools, we don't have the peonle to man the ships at sea.
However, I bet we have more than four times the percentage of officers in
school now than we did in 1022. I never did so to any school excent to
the National War College. I said why should. I go to a school to learn
tactics when I'm doing it out here in the ocean? But t^ere was no ques-
tion that we were erettinfr licked in the political arena, in the JCS and
the Secretary's office. We were not used to fl-rhtinsr the other services,
we'd always presented our case to Congress. As we pet more intellectual,
better educated I guess you would say, we need more horse sense. That is
what the Secretary (McNamara) lacked.
Q. 2. Doesn't the fleet still discriminate against officers who receive
post-graduate training?
A. 2. Well, yes. I remember when I sat on my last selection board in
195^-55. 1 didn't think time in school was worthwhile. If a man's record
came uu and he had snent three years in school while he was a Comrrander,
that was frree years that he wasn't saining any experience. He didn't
have any fitness renorts. I don't want some professor tellinrc me who I
should promote. But we can't do th^t anymore. I don't feel that, we
should emnhasize schooling too much, but i* you come 111 with two officers
who are ecual in all other respects, then may^e the advantage sho'ild go
to the officer with schooling. If they are equal in all other respects.

Q. 3. In a recent book, James Roherty has said that the Navy "did not
enter into the fray (about the nuclear carrier in I962) with its customary
assuredness. ., .there was noticeable ambivalence in the Navy attitude
toward nuclear propulsion. .. .the Navy had allowed a doctrinal gap to
develop with resect to the utilization of attack carriers." Is that the
way you saw it?
A. 3. When Korth called me over, I didn't know what was going on, but I
was suspicious. I never could figure out why George took that Ambassador
job. I was really furious. Fred asked me if I would take the job and I
said no, I didn't want the job, I already had four stars and wouldn't get
any wo^e and I wanted the job in London. Well, Fred asked me to eo sit
outside because he had a couple of things to do and then we'd go down and
talk to 3ob (McNamara). We got started down and he said that Bo1, was out
of town and that we'd ho in and talk to Gilpatrick. As soon as we walked
in, he was talking to me and not me to him. It was obvious that Korth
had called him. So after awhile it became obvious that the President had
already made u'o his mind, and when I asked Gilpatrick that he said it was
true, I told him thatil.'m not that big a. fool, so I'd take the job,
I looked at my job as one of pouring oil on troubled waters. The
Navy and the Secretary of Defense had gotten so far apart the Navy was
not going to get anything. All communications had broken down. I know
many people felt I was kow-towing and they were right. I would have
kissed McNamara' s ass at hirch noon if I thought it would help to smooth
things over and there were many times I felt I had. There were lots of
times that I didn't agree with him, but I never, foufrht him in public or
underhandedly with the Congress. The fellow who said he would rather be
right than President was never President. With respect to the carrier, I
felt we needed a deck. Also I had never been a rabid supporter of t Ke
need for nuclear rower for a carrier. If we needed nuclear power it was
for the destroyers. They had to be refueled every day, the carrier only
every three to five days. I remember talking in his office with Pastori
and he said, Admiral you are settling for a slice and we are trying to
get a whole loaf. I said, yes, but we're awfully hungry.
I probably never would have made it if it hadn't of been for Ike
Kidd (now Chief of Naval Material). Ke was my aide and he always said,
Admiral, if you quit the chances are 99 out of 100 that your relief will
think the same way you do,.bu + he won't have the experience you have had
in dealing; with the current situation. I almost, turned in my suit, but I
finally didn't. Everyone wondered how I got alon^ with McNamara and
Gilpatrick and Nitze. I didn't agree but I had made un my mind that I
would set alonr so that the Navy could profit in the end. Nitze and 1
discussed that we would have to get alonr. His aide was Bud Zumwalt and
he walked the fine line of not be^nm disloyal to either Nitze or me. Bud
was in tiebt with Nitze. I have never been happier with Barry Gold water
when he refused to nermit Nitze to be appointed to ISA the other week. I
can't trove it, but I think that Bud would have been back in the Pentagon
within a few weeks as a civilian. I even got alonr with Alain rJnthovon.
He was a real intellectual, but I pot alonp with him. He came down to
tell me goodby before I left and I told him why I had rotten a] on" with
him, it was because I knew that he didn't believe in some of those things
he had supported. He had been directed to find a way of supporting some
decision McNamara wanted to make and he did so. I don't have any nuarrel
with a man like that.

The only time that I went to McNamara and said I couldn't support
him was over the FuL. The concept was "bad, that this ship was going to
pull up to a prepared dock and make an unopposed landing. The whole
purpose of the idea was to cut down the Army by bringing troops back from
Europe. I told Bob that, and he said, well, I'll kill it then if you're
going to oppose me. I told him that I wasn't going to oppose it, no sir,
but I would not support it.
Dick Russell and I were from the same small town in Georgia,
probably about 6000 people total, but I never used our friendship. If I
couldn't do it above board, I didn't do it. The only time I went to him
was when Humphrey was trying; to get the CNO's house. Dick didn't know
that the bill was even under consideration and he told me he'd take care
of it. Kidd was doing some things under the table with Congress on the
TFX and I ordered him to stop it when I relieved.
McNamara really had us over a barrel. He was trying to reduce
the number of carriers to 10 or 12. We had never had any justification
for the number of carriers except that we said that we had to have three
for every one deployed, that we needed two for NATO and three for SEATO,
so we needed fifteen. We said that for so long everyone believed it,
particularly our allies. We ended up keening them deployed so lone- we
ended up wearing down the American bluejacket. McNamara could cut our
legs out from under us. Renuire-ents are a matter of opinion. We are an
easy target because it is impossible to prove requirements. You can
always change your assumptions, it is only a matter of justifying your
opinion. This is one of the main reasons I disagree with Zumwalt. I
have never publically opposed him, I told him I wouldn't, but change sould
be gradual. All requirements are essentially a matter of opinion, and if
your successor al^o makes radical changes then the Navy goes all over the
map, aigging and' zagging. All changes should be gradual, then if time
proves you're going in the right direction, your successor can increase
the amount of change.
I believed that the time had come for nuclear power, but I also
believed that we wouldn't get a nuclear CVA-67 without at least a delay
of one year. Actually we never would have gotten the carrier. If we had
made an issue and fought McNamara, he would have delayed the carrier, and
we would have had to fiffht the battle again the next year and the next
year and the next. Time was important. We needed the carrier. In the
end, McNamara went along with me. There was no change in analysis.
McNamara just became convinced that the Navy was not his enemy. In
addition, it was possible at the time to advocate the conventional power
plant, without arguing against nuclear power.
There were a hell of a lot of things on my mind that wer° more
important than the nuclear carrier. Let me give you an example of the
need for raonort with the Secretary of Defense. When it was time to name
a new CINGPAC, I was completely outvoted in the JCS. Even the Commadnnt
of the Marine Co^ps voted against me and he wondered why I didn't support
him later. I supported the Corns, but not him. Anyway, it was important
that the Navy get the job. I didn't think the war was goln^ to last
forever, and when it was over, the other services weren't going to be
interested in that area. So I went to McNamara and told him I waited
Sharp in that job but the rest of the Chiefs were voting for the Air Force
man. McNamara" told me he'd take care of it and he did so, despite the
combined votes of the Chiefs. The only problem was that then I owed the
son of a bitch a favor.

Q. k. Did you feel KcNamara was using the threat of not building other
surface ships to nrevent a strong Navy position on the nuclear carrier?
A. k. No. The whole thing was a matter of money. KcNamara was a
pacifist, you know. He was a perfect schoolteacher. There was a Jeckle
and Hyde personality. We were having him over to dinner and my wife was
scared how she would respond to such a cold fish. I told her she would
find him interesting. Afterward she told me that he was absolutely
charmine-. KcNamara was trying to hold the budget down. Johnson didn't
want the public to know how much it was costing. He wouldn't let us call
up the reserves. KcNamara was telling him what Johnson wanted to hear
when Bob told h'm it could be done out of stockpiles and then rebuilt
over a long period. The President was interested in domestic politics
and didn't want to be bothered with international affairs. Just like
Nixon is the opposite. The President would make a decision on what he
could sell -Dolitically for a budget and it was difficult to argue with a
man with his credentials.
It was impossible to tell what was the President's Dolicy or what
was KcNamara* s. I remember in the Spring of 1965, when I almost turned
in my suit. The Chiefs and McNamara had agreed on a policy and he went
to explain it to the President. The next day he came back and we sat
down and he said now this is what we're going to do. I said wait a
minute, Bob, you've got this turned around. We didn't agree on this, and
he said this is what I've decided. I said, why don't you just say that
the President didn't buy our plan. I tell my Heads when someone doesn't
buy something, and then I tell them to get out and do it. I don't tell
the Lieutenant Commanders, but I tell my leaders. And Bob sat there and
said that's not the way I do it. So it was difficult to assign blame.
You know Johnson was sincere. He had always said that when he
got to a nosition of responsibility, he was going to do something; for the
poor people, and when he got there he was saddled with that war that he
couldn't get out of. In addition, he had a sta^f that was composed of
some Kennedy-phobes. They thought that everything Kennedy had done was
perfect and that any change was wrong. I would have fired the whole lot
of them.
The JCS lost Johnson. When he first became President we met. with
him for cocktails and lunch at least once a week and then after a while
it was only once a month, and then for the last one and a half years it
was no meetings. I've thought for a lone time how we lost him and I
think it was because we didn't supnort the manner in which he wanted to
conduct the war. Those meetings were really open with five and take and
he understood how we felt. After a while it became embarrassing for him
to invite us in to criticize him.
Before we lost him, we were down at the ranch a lot. I alv.-ays
sat across from him at the table where we had drinks and then we would go
for a drive in several cars and I always rode with him, and then we would
come back at the big table they had improvised. Well, we did that once
and the Chiefs were standing around talking afterward and getting ready
to leave, and Wheeler said that we ought to say goodby to the President
and I went back and told him goodby and he grabbed me and leaned over and
whispered, "Now you just don't worry about that carrier, you h^ar" and I
knew that I had won. I went back outside and told the other Chiefs.
Well, boys, I won.

Q. 5. How were the Navy's relations with Congress? Did that have an
impact unon the Carrier?
A. $. Well, I never used my relationship with Dick Russell except for
that once. John Connally is probably the best friend I ever had in the
world. He and I were shipmates during the war. I didn't use politics
the way Zumwalt does, buttonholing people on particular issues anri trying
to find ways of getting to them. I stopped Kidd from giving Congress info
under the table. I said that we'd go up to the Committee anytime, but
above board.
Of course, everyone has different methods. I tried to establish
a reputation of validity with Confrress. They knew tha.t I would tell the
truth. I was the first CNO to invite visiting CNOs to stay at my house
rather than at a hotel. And a few weeks after relieving I noticed that a
Congressman had played football at Michigan so I called him up and invited
him to go with me to the Navy-Michigan football game. He said that
unfortunately he always took his eldest sons alonrr with him, so I invited
them, too. Then Jerry Ford and I went out and within a couple of months
he and his wife were guests at my house. V.'e always had some Congressmen
as guests at all of our social occasions, when just a few couples sat
around and talked. And when I went up on the Hill, I had a friend in
court, but I didn't discuss specific issues.
,
Probably the best training I had for the job as CNO was when I
was aide to Dan Kimble and he moved to be the Under Secretary. He really
was an under secretary. In Ens-land, the military never appear on the
Hill, just the civilians. Well, Dan was an old lobbyist and he loved it.
He was really good, he did everything I suggested. I ran the Navy more
from his office than I did when I was CNO. I really got to know quite a
few Congressmen in that job. Dan was really a diamond in the rough. He
drank a lot and ran around a lot and I had to watch out for him. One
thing about Congressmen that you will have to realize is that the great
majority of them are honest patriots doing their job. In some cases,
they become convinced that the country is best o^f with them in office
and they will do things that you and I rni^ht not do, but they honestly
believe that it is for the good of the country.
Q. 6. Did you feel that KcNamara and his staff were initially biased
toward the selection of land based tactical air versus sea based tactical
air because of their backgrounds?
A. 6. There was no question ab-rut that. In fact, the bias toward the
Air Force was shown by the TFX affair. The most critical design parameter
were those involved with carrier operation. The several parameters which
were most critical should have been selected and then the plane designed
inside the envelope. I rave no conflict with the services having the
same plane which is not the optimum design for any one job. I thin'- that
it probably would save money. The Navy wasted its time fighting the
concept. I told my people to make it. work because it was the only thing
we were goin^ to get. I then stayed clear from any knowledge of it
because I knew it would fail. If you look at my Congressional testimony,
I always say, "My technical people tell me it wVll work, and I believe in
them." No one asked me what my spat of the pants evaluation was, and I
never volunteered it. You don't realize thn bitternrr.r, that had been
engendered by the TFX fight. The TFX was more than 50/° of our problems

with McNamara. You don't insult a man's baby daughter. The atmosphere
of hatred affected everything else. I supported the TFX in order to get





• 3 May 1974




Interview with Admiral James Russell, USN (ret), (Vice Chief of
Naval Operations from June IQ58 - May lQ6l) conducted on 30 April 1974
from 1700 to 2040 and 2 May from 1600-1800 between Dulles International
Airport and the Army-Navy Club. No notes were taken. This paraphrasion
was reconstructed from memory beginning at 2215 on 30 Ar>ril 1°74.
Q. 1. Adm. Russell—In discussing the decisions Mr. McNamara marie,
James Roherty said that with respect to the Nuclear Carrier "the Navy did
not enter into the fray with its customary assuredness.
.. .there was
noticeable ambivalence in the Navy attitude toward nuclear propulsion....
the Navy had allowed a doctrinal gap to develop with respect to the
utilization of attack carriers."
From a reading o^ some of the material, it appeared to me that it
may have been rore complicated than that. What were your perceptions?
A. 1. You have to understand the circumstances. The Navy did not have
too good a position with the Secretariat before McNamara. V/e had a great
deal of trouble with Secretary Gates. Two examples are pertinent. Gates
was interested in playing down interservice rivalry, and when Admiral
Libby mane a speech in San Diego which was purely inflamatory, Gates
demanded that Burke (the CN0) fire Libby, that he require that Libby
resign immediately. Burke refused and told Gates he (Burke) was willing
to go to the President over it.
The second example occurred over the Single Integrated Operations
Plan (SIOP). Burke felt that the whole idea was nothing more than an
effort to cive the whole strategic package to the Air Force, Ke went to
the President (Eisenhower) over it but the President upheld his Secretary,
so we lost, but Burke insisted that the second in command at the JSTPS
(which constructs the S10P) be Navy, a 3 -star, and since the SIOP was
computerized, Burke went out and took a course in computers.
Gates was pretty mad at us and he told McNamara he had to watch
these Admirals and Generals or they'd run over him. For a man of McNamara's
personality, that was all he needed.
We also did not make a food start with the new Secretary of the
Navy—Connally. As soon as he was named, Burke invited him up to stay at
the Observatory House. The problem is that Burke is not a good host.
Connally came up without his wife and was rattling around that house and
Burke forgot about him. Burke gets so involved, he just forgets. Anyway,
I arranged a bachelor party for him and went looking for some good remarks
to introduce him with, I found out that, very much to his credit, he had
been a fighter director aboard a carrier during World War II and when the
action sot hot and his Congressional friends wanted, to brimT him back, he
refused to go back. I also found out that he didn't drink. When I had
the party and introduced him, he took my relating of these facts wrong,
and when he stood up he only said, "You have excellent G-2." and sat
down. Burke and 'Russell-' were in trouble from then on.
To understand the rest of our problems, you have to understand
what sort of person McNamara was.. He was cold, impersonal and Inconsider-
ate. For a counle of examples of how he disregarded noonle, he went
mountain climbing in the Northwest and didn't even bother to tell anyone
he was coming or that he was there. Later (1963) I Invited him to stay

at my villa in Italy when he was in the area, and he didn't even bother
to answer. His secretary came over and we had a really nice time.
McNamara didn't care about anybodyl
Q. 2. Was Adm, Burke an effective "politician" for the Navy or was he
somewhat restrained by the events of 19^9 in which Burke had been taken
off the Admirals' list and the CNO (ADM Dedman) had been fired over the
objections of Congress?
A. 2. Burke was a poor sneaker. This helped him on the Hill because of
his reputation (as a war hero). When he searched for a word, everyone
was leaning forward trying to help him. He wasn't a particularly good
politician. He didn't like to use politics (influence on the Hill; or
use system analysis to try to muddy up the waters. He wasn't like
Zumwalt, he was reluctant to get in there and lobby and to be "cute"
about analysis tricks or Congressional ties.
He was not at all inhibited by the events of 19^9. I served with
him in the Pacific dur'ng the war. He didn't change. No- one thought he
was inhibited.
Q. 3. Did you perceive that Secretary McNamara and his immediate staff
were particularly pro- or con- the AF or the Navy?
A. 3. There is no question about the fact that they favored the Air
Force. They understood more about them. At least they understood about
a land-based tactical air forces. They didn't understand about how you
got the logistics, the POL, there. They had this idea about bare-base
deployment which was half-baked. We had terrible problems trying to
educate them. A man named Rosenzweig was the man who was in charge of
analysis of this and he didn't unders+and the use of carriers. We never
did succeed in educating him, in fact, he got worse before he left.
There was a point in which he was bein^ nuestion^ri in Congress and they
got down on him, felt he was misrepresenting various problems and he
really lost emotional control. He was really impossible toward the end.
Do you remember how Adm. Anderson got fired. The whole problem
was over some testimony before a Committee on the Hill. All the members
of the Secretary's staff were sitting around with sharpened pencils
waiting for a copy of his statement and he told them he didn't have one,
he was just going up there to tell the truth (about the TFX ) . Then
McNamara sent (Secretary of the Navy) Korth out to the Observatory on a
Sunday morninf to tell Anderson th- t he was fired. On a Sunday morning
when Anderson was getting ready for an afternoon party for various
members of different staffs, Korth came out to tell him he was fired.
Anderson immediately called Kennedy who didn't know anything about it.
Anderson was really deenly hurt. He went in to see McNamara about it
the next mornin^ and McNamara came across his room with his hand out and
Anderson put his hand behind him and said, "No, Mr. Secretary, you have
deeply hurt me, I always have believed that a man should be able and
required to tell the truth."
Anyway there was quite some talk ab'ut the f\r\n* and McNamara
told Kennedy that i f the President appointed Anderson to anything in the
Continental United States that he, McNamara, would resign. So Keorv
offered Anderson the Ambassadorship to Portugal. Anderson asked for 4fl

hours to think it over. Burke advised him not to take it, that it was
time to make a stand, and not to take anything from them, hut Adm. Claude
Rickets was the VCNO and he advised Anderson to take it because he could
do the country some good as an Ambassador. Anderson took Ricketts advice
and Burke was furious.
I always felt that Korth was instrumental in seeing that the TFX
got awarded to Texas. I always felt there was something crooked there.
I never did figure out how he got appointed to a position of public
trust. He wasn't an honest man. I think Connally just recommended him
bec?oise he was from Texas. Not even his wife could stand him, she
divorced him because he was so obnoxious.
There vras no other reason to make that decision. I went into
McNamara's office with Curt LeMay, and I told McNamara that a second
rate fighter aircraft was no fighter at all. You can have a second-rate
bomber, but what escorts that bomber in? The supersonic carability at
low altitudes that the Air Force needed was being compromised in order
to reduce the w^'i%Vd to that which could be handled by the carrier launch-
ing gear. As it was, the most optimum (best) catapult which was installed
on any carrier would have been the only one capable of launching the
aircraft. McNamara didn't understand how difficult it was to achieve
a capability to handle the aircraft. He didn't understand what he was
doing to the Air Force plane in order to make it meet Navy reouirements.
I said, "Thank you, Mr. Secretary, 1* and Curt and I got up to leave. Then
Curt blurted out, "But Mr. Secretary, if we have to use the same plane,
it really should be built to Air Force specifications." That was typical
LeMay.
McNamara didn't fire LeMay when he fired Anderson. LeMay had
gained too much national support from his performance as head of SAC.
He also had an aura about him which made the Secretary afraid of him.
He' had done a good job for them there, although noone ever thought that
he was an intellectual heavyweight as Chief of Staff. Anyway, McNamara
called LeMay in his office and talked to him and led him along, telling
him how unhairny he was with the job that LeMay was doing and then at
the end -he said, "and so, I've decided to ask you to stay on as Chief of
Staff." LeMay went over to the window that looks over the river entrance
(to the Pentagon) and looked out while he composed himself. He was really
upset, and then he said, "Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your confidence."
and walked out. He was furious.
McNamara couldn't even use his own staff. You remember "McNamara's
Fence" (in Vietnam). He couldn't get his own staff to do it, so he came
to me and asked me to evaluate it with General Starbird. It was designed
to combat infiltration but the Marines thought it was Maginot Line
mentality. You tell the enemy where you are going to stand and fight
him. They cleared some areas for the implantation of his devices, but
the areas also could serve awfully well as machine gun sweep/control
areas. McNamara came to me directly to ensure that the nrorram was
carried out (it used Navy sonobouys) because he couldn't even rely on
his own staff.
*Has.:A.>+*4^^ 11 Si" - VU:— **'' t»~i

Q. 4. Did you feel that Adm. Rickover was cooperating with the rest of
the Navy on the question of nuclear power for the carrier/surface ships?
A. 4. Adm. Rickover felt that nuclear power was good for everything.
(Adm. Russell avoided commenting- specifically on the thrust of the
question although the cmesticn was posed, in different forms, at least
four times). I ren-ember the- first time we met.
The first time I met Rickover, we had an electrical system in
those days that was 12 volts DC and it was cranky. The first time' a new
pilot sot out on the deck with the wind goins over, he'd overprime the
engine and run down the battery. Then we'd have to get him off the line
and out of the way someway. Well, I figured out that if we ran jumper
cables out to the planes we could get him off no matter how much' he
overprimed the engine. I figured that if I placed four small motor-
generators around the deck I could make it work. I talked to the Air
Wins Commander and the Cantain and got in a plane and went to try to fret
permission to do so. I went down to Main Navy yard (in Washington) and
wandered around trying to find out who vras in charge. Finally, I found
the officer that was in charge of the Electrical Division, a Lt. Rickover.
I explained to him what I wanted to do and he immediately flew into a
rampasre. ne said, "Do you know how much copper that would take? There's
not that much copper in the United States, etc., etc." Anyway he chased
me out, and I had to return to the shit) from my unsuccessful trip with
my tail between my legs.
He was thorough thourh, nothing ever got put on any ship that he
personally had not ^proved.
The second time we met, I was Commanding Officer of a carrier out
in the Pacific following World War II and things were pretty slack, we
were making up for the war. I remember setting the course so that we
would raise Wake Island at dawn and I sot on the MC system myself and
sayins "Now everyone V/ake up and see the Island." Anyway in 1 °U7 I sot
orders to report to Oak Ridse, and would end up beins there from 1947 to
1950. When I got there, it was still under Army command. Cantain
Rickover was there and I found out that he was the most popular man there.
I couldn't believe that this was the same Rickover that I knew. I asked
around and found out that he stood number one in his training class and
had impressed everyone. He was obsessed with the idea of nutting nuclear
power on a submarine and all the sclent 'sts there were really impressed
with him and were in favor of his efforts.
I remember when Nautilus went under the pole and we were trying
to outdo the Russian Sputnik achievement. Rickover had been against the
pro.iect from the besinnins. When Anderson, I don't know whether he is
Senator or Representative Anderson now, but when he got out from under
the pole, we picked him up at sea and flew him into Re.y<^vrit (Iceland)
and then to Washington. His wife was brought to meet the President and
she didn't know where they had sone or when they would be back. I was
in charge of setting the guests there and Eisenhower sot to worrying
about the fact that there misht be too many neonle there. I had already
invited CINCLANT, the operational commander, I was honln^ he wouldn't
want to come but he accepted. When Gates asked me if we should invite •
Rickover, I raid "no, he wasn't concerned with operational mat tern."
Well, the cere-ony went o^f and Mn Anderson- was really surprised.. The
reporters noticed that Rickover wasn't there and went to see him to ask
him why he wasn't there. Well, you know Rickover, he wouldn't ever he! n
anybody out. He said, "The sons of bitches didn't VnvVte me." Well,

the next day there were headlines all over the place. Gates had to take
the "blame to take it off the President and he wasn't hapny. As penance,
I had to ride between Anderson and Rickover in the New York City ticker
tat>e parade. Rickover is a remarkable man. I believe all his success
is due to his thoroughness. He is tireless and exacting.
Rickover went on a tour of Russia and was invited to tour their
nuclear icebreaker in addition to many other areas and when he came back
I asked him to come over and sneak to the officers in OPNAV. He agreed
to and gave a really good sneech. Afterward, he was in my office and
looking at me the way he does and be said, "you know, you can get people
to work for you by being nice to them. I never could." I avoided the
obvious question. as to whether he had ever tried.
Rick had convinced the Congress that the only thing that was
useful was nuclear power. They were even on the point of passing a
resolution that all surface ships had to be nuclear-powered. Nuclear
power was a revolution in submarines, but was only another method of
pushing for a surface ship.
Q. 5« How was the feeling in Congress toward the Navy and the Carrier?
A. 5- There was no question that we had problems. Kahon was even worse
than Cannon in many respects. The primary problem we were having in
Congress was that they wouldn't vote for the carrier requests unless it
was nuclear-powered and we couldn't get it through the Secretary as
nuclear-powered. We lost both ways. The big objection to the nuclear
carrier was cost.
Q. 6. Was there any carryover from the Mitchell controversy about
Carrier vulnerability?
,
A. 6. The Air Force was always sniping. They were a new service and
they didn't have the responsibilities that the other two did. This gave
them a great deal more flexibility in establishing various positions.
Q. 7. Vincent Davis credits you as being "Father of the Polaris". Did
you feel that the great amount of money being snent for nuclear-powered
tactical and strategic submarines detracted from the building up of
tactical forces thus leading to block obsolescence?
A. 7. Burke used to have a stack of chits on his desk when he was CNO
that had a blank spot to fill in that said "BLANK is the Inventor of the
Polaris." I was BUAIR back when 3UAIR really had some nower. The man
who really thought of marrying the submarine and the ballistic missile
was Charlie who worked for me. We had an air breathing miss Vie
at that time hut it didn't have sufficient range. So it was obvious
that the solid nropellant ballistic missile was the way to po. I went
to see Charlie Wilson, who was Secretary of Defense at the time. He
said we could do it if we used the Army missile, the Juniter. Well, the
Juniter was a liquid nropel lant missile. Can you Imagine loading that
extremely noxious nitric oxide on board a submarine? It was an Impossible
Idea. Well, I had some nower at the time, so I issued three contracts
by myself for the development of a solid propellant missile.

There was no question that the submarines were expensive and were
detracting; from the normal buildinc program. We still have the Block
obsolescence problem. Zumwalt's His-h/Low mix is probably the worst
answer to that.
Completed reconstruction at 00^5.
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$42. 6B 43.6 51.4 55.4 54.0 51.6
Total DoD Procurement $15.IB 14.6 17.9 17.6 14.9 13.9
Army Procurement $ 1.3B 1.5 2.5 2.5 2.9 1.7
Army % of Total
Procurement 95S 10 14 14 19 12
Air Force Procurement
Aircraft 3.0 3.2 :i 3.1 3.5 3.4 3.5
Missiles 3.0 2.6 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.7









$ 7. OB 6.0
AF % of Total
Procurement 46# 48 41 39 43 43
Navy Procurement
Ship Construction
and Conversion $ 2. OB 2.8 2.9. 2.9 2.1 1.9
Aircraft & Missiles 2.1 • 2.1 2.7 3.0 2.9 2.5
Other 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.0
Total 4.5 5.3 6.4 6.8 6.2 6.4
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$ 1.2B 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.07 -
0.7 1.4 1.3 0.8 0.4 0.5
Amphibious 0.04 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.6
Mine Warfare and
Patrol Craft 0.07 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.4
Auxiliaries 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.4
Total $ 2. 0B 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.1 1.9
% of Total
Procurement 13^ 19 16 16 14 14
% of Total
Procurement (less
Polaris) 6% 13 12 13 14 14
Construction Funds fort
CVAs 1 - 1 ma - -
L DLGNs - — - - i -
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DLGs 3 6 _ - •• -














SSNs 2 3 4
SSBNs 3 5 6 6 - -
-
. ASRs - - 1 — 1 1 1
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